Robert Key: Will the Minister review the way in which the mental health charity Combat Stress is financed? He is right to say that it has a wonderful record, but the charity can receive money from the Ministry of Defence only for those who are in receipt of a war pension, and many servicemen and women do not show symptoms of stress until up to14 years after they have been discharged from the services. The problem is therefore going to grow, and a brilliantly cost-effective way of dealing with it would be through that well established charity, which he visited in December and I visited with the Defence Committee last Thursday.

Derek Twigg: As the hon. Gentleman says, the charity Combat Stress does excellent work and I thoroughly enjoyed my visit to see exactly what itdoes. As I said, we fund the charity to the tune of£2.9 million and we are going to give it a significant increase in funding. Perhaps I did not make this clear in my previous answer, but we are considering setting up pilot schemes around the country to enable the NHS, Combat Stress and the MOD to see how we can improve the support for former service personnel who suffer mental illness as a result of their service, and part of that work will cover commissioning. That has been welcomed by Combat Stress, but there is more work to be done. I hope that we will be able to make an announcement on those pilot schemes in the not-too-distant future.

Richard Younger-Ross: The Minister may be aware that the funding of a numberof the mental health trusts across the country is threadbare. When someone is transferred from military care to NHS care, we must ensure that funding is available within the area where that person wishes to reside. Will the Minister discuss the matter with the Secretary of State for Health to ensure that funding is provided for those mental health trusts?

James Arbuthnot: In considering the future of the Portsmouth naval base, does the Secretary of State agree that, among the issues to be considered, two are important? One is the viability of the future joint venture between VT and BAE Systems. Another is the difficulty of persuading naval personnel to move away from the home of the Royal Navy, as their spouses may wellbe deeply ensconced in their own careers in the Portsmouth area.

Des Browne: I assure my hon. Friend that weare fully engaged with a number of stakeholders, including other Government Departments and regional development agencies, in jointly working up the cost implications of different naval base review options. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces recently met ministerial colleagues from other Departments to discuss that very issue.

Des Browne: We need to be careful lest we increase the proliferation of rumours, but I accept that every rumour detrimental to my job is an opportunity for a Back Bencher. All I can say to the hon. Gentleman is that our co-operation on the carriers with the Frenchis very productive, as they have made a significant contribution. We continue to work with them. The new President and Government who have been elected still support the venture, and I look forward to continued co-operation. As for conclusions, the hon. Gentleman will just have to wait with everyone else for the outcome.

Julian Lewis: Is not the real reason why the naval base review has been undertaken at all the fact that the Government have slashed the size of the surface fleet, and the admirals fear that if they do not reduce their base capacity another six frigates and destroyers will go, on top of the 10 already lost? Does the Secretary of State at least accept that over the very long term, the sort of threats that we face may change and any reduction in naval base capacity should be reversible, whereas the closure of either Portsmouth or Devonport would be irreversible? Is not the answer flexibility, rather than closure?

Des Browne: My hon. Friend is aware that there is evidence to suggest that armaments and, in particular, improvised explosive devices—roadside bombs, for want of another way of describing them—are being deployed against our troops in southern Iraq, and that they have their provenance in Iran. That is why we have UK forces deployed along the border in Maysanand why we continue to train and mentor the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement, which has ultimate responsibility for border issues. It is also one of the reasons why the coalition and the Iraqi security forces conduct boarding operations in Iraqi territorial waters and the northern Gulf.

Mark Harper: One other aspect of this issue is that if the counter-insurgency operations are successful in southern Iraq and in Baghdad, particularly those supported by Iran, there is a risk that Iranian-supported insurgents may simply move their operations and start to operate againstour forces and NATO forces in Afghanistan. What assessment has the Defence Secretary made of that risk?

Des Browne: I am afraid that I shall have to write to my hon. Friend about that. I cannot deal with such specificity of questioning in terms of the brief in front of me, but I shall get back to her and ensure that the whole House is made aware of the answer.

Des Browne: The security situation in Afghanistan remains stable,if fragile in places. UK forces, as part of the wider ISAF—international security assistance force—mission, are engaged in operations to extend the authority of the Government of Afghanistan across Helmand province and southern Afghanistan.

Des Browne: In answer to the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, the surgeon general, who has responsibility for the area, made it clear that he believes we provide a service that is second to none in Afghanistan for those wounded in action. There is no evidence to suggest that anybody has lost their life, or has not been properly treated, because of a lack of helicopter support. Indeed, given the distances involved in Afghanistan, we now deploy consultant-led teams on helicopters to ensure that people have appropriate support when the helicopter reaches them.
	I have announced an increase in the number of helicopters in Afghanistan and increased the numberof helicopter hours, and am satisfied that I have met the demands for helicopters made by the chain of command. More widely, of course, we have taken decisions to invest £230 million in 14 more helicopters so that they can be available for deployment if necessary.

Des Browne: The FSTA was designed to enter service in such a way that it meets the out-of-service datesfor both the VC10 and the TriStar fleets. They are inextricably linked, and always have been. The calendar age of an aircraft is not an indicator of its operational utility or its remaining service life. Indeed, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman flies on aircraft that are of a considerable age in the fleets of many air carriers around the world.

Michael Penning: One excellent organisation that helps our servicemen whey they leave the armed forces is the Royal British Legion. Sadly, it does not get information from Her Majesty's armed forces when servicemen leave. Is there any way to increase communication with the Royal British Legion so that it knows when servicemen are leaving, as it did when I left, and can help them with benefits and housing when they arrive?

Jim Devine: We should not provide only social housing to our ex-service personnel. Veterans day is next week, and on Sunday I shall hand out 70 badges to armed forces veterans who servedas recently as 1984. One of those veterans flew32 bombing missions to Germany, and ended up as Field Marshall Montgomery's driver. I am sure that my hon. Friend will want to pay tribute to those veterans. Can he tell us how many badges have been handed out by his Department, and what it is doing to publicise that wonderful initiative?

Nick Harvey: I welcome the engagement of Defence Ministers with Housing Ministers to address the issues. Will the Minister stress to Housing Ministers the need to look at some of the anomalies in legislation, in particular the Housing Act 1996, whereby an armed forces family with children who are happily settled in a school and a spouse who is working in the community is not deemed to have a local connection simply because it was posted there? Local authorities cannot even begin to plan to provide accommodation for armed forces families while they are still in accommodation, and they could spend anything up to a couple of years in temporary accommodation. I am sure that the Minister will agree that that is not the best start for our armed servicemen when they begin their civilian life.

Derek Twigg: We have been talking to colleaguesin the DCLG about that very issue of the local connection. I assure the hon. Gentleman that whenwe are in a position to do so, we will make an announcement.

Kim Howells: We are deeply concerned about the recent violenceand the humanitarian situation in the Gaza strip.The violence we have seen has been completely unacceptable, with summary executions, attacks against hospitals and the cruel treatment of captives. Once again, extremists carrying guns have prevented progress, against the wishes of the majority, who seek a peaceful two-state solution.
	Our immediate concern is the humanitarian situation in Gaza. We fully support the statement of the Quartet and efforts to meet the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians. In that regard, we welcome Israel's decision to facilitate humanitarian access and ensure the provision of basic services. We continue to call on all parties to respect the human rights of those in Gaza and ensure the safety and security of international workers.
	It is also important, however, that extremists are not allowed to derail the political process. The international community is united in its desire to continue moving the peace process forward. The Foreign Secretary spoke to President Abbas on 14 June, as well as US Secretary Rice and the Egyptian, Omani and Qatari Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Secretary is discussing the situation with her European counterparts at the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Luxembourg today, where they will also discuss the situation with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni. Prime Minister Olmert is currently in Washington and we look forward to discussions at the UN Security Council on Wednesday.
	We welcome the Arab League's engagement at its meeting on Friday. The Arab world has a key role to play in supporting President Abbas's efforts to restore order to the occupied Palestinian territories. We also welcome Egypt and Saudi Arabia's efforts to promote dialogue.
	The emergency Government, who were sworn in on 17 June, have our full support. We will continue to work with all those, including President Abbas, who are dedicated to achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The emergency Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, has said that his priorities are restoring security and improving the economic and humanitarian situation, and we share those goals.
	I would like to reiterate the Government's commitment to finding a solution that will result in a comprehensive and lasting peace, with two states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace and security.
	Our thoughts remain with Alan Johnston. We continue to call for his immediate release and welcome the efforts being taken towards that goal.

Keith Simpson: Following five days of fighting between Fatah and the Hamas factions, by Thursday last week Hamas militiahad seized control of the Gaza strip. That appears to have come as a surprise to the American and Israeli Governments, and to our own Government. Can the Minister explain why he thinks the seizure of power came about so quickly?
	We welcome the Quartet's prompt action in convening an urgent meeting on Saturday and giving its support to President Abbas, and that of the United States and the European Union in lifting the boycott on the Palestinian Authority and resuming the transfer of aid. However, it is clear that those are only the preliminary steps.
	Given that before the latest violence 87 per cent. of the population of Gaza were living below the poverty line, what action do the Government believe can be taken to prevent the development of a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza? How quickly will the EU and others be able to convey maximum aid and assistance to the new Palestinian Cabinet to stave off the risk of a breakdown in law and order on the west bank? The EU high representative said this morning that most of the EU funding would go to the west bank, but that some would go to Gaza. What form will the assistance to Gaza take, and is the Minister confident that we can prevent it from ending up in the pockets of Hamas?
	What steps are being taken to prevent the violence from spreading to the west bank? Will the Minister assure us that there will be no weakening of our position on Hamas, and that it must meet the Quartet's conditions? Has there been any indication that it will do so?
	What assessment has the Minister made of any involvement on the part of Iran, which has openly supported Hamas? Does he believe that it will increase its involvement in Gaza and, if so, what is likely to be the reaction of our Government, EU Governments and the United States?

Kim Howells: The European Union, the United Kingdom and the international community have given more money to the Palestinian people over the past12 months than ever before. That is important. We would like the customs revenues that the Israelis have collected to be disbursed to the Palestinian President Abbas so that they can be used to reconstruct its sadly depleted economy. I also hope that the Israelis can take the opportunity to remove some of the roadblocks at checkpoints, which are doing such terrible damageto the Palestinian economy. If, however, the hon. Gentleman is asking me to blame the west, Israel and everyone else for a Hamas coup d'etat, I am sorry, but I cannot do it.

Kim Howells: My hon. Friend will know that$100 million has already been earmarked for release to President Abbas's authority. I agree with my hon. Friend, and, indeed, we have long called for the money to be released. I am sure, however, that he will understand the concern about releasing it to Hamas, when it behaves as it does. There is great reticence to give it to an organisation that might find some way to pass it to suicide bombers or rocketeers, who then try to kill Israelis and their enemies in the Palestinian population.

Malcolm Rifkind: Has not Hamas shown its true colours by turning with such violence on its fellow Palestinians? Does not that vindicate the refusal of the international community to treat with it? I strongly agree with the Minister of State's calling on Israel not only to release funds due to the Palestinian Government, but to make some important move on easing the roadblocks. It is very damaging that Palestinians cannot move around the west bank. Does the Minister agree that it wouldbe particularly symbolic and important if Mahmoud Abbas could show that the freedom of ordinary Palestinians is being increased in the west bank, just as a Hamas Administration are likely to be reducing personal freedoms in Gaza?

Robert Walter: As has been said, the election of the Hamas Governmentwas a result of the failure of the international community, especially Israel, to support the previous Fatah Government. Somewhat late in the day, the international community is rallying around the emergency Fatah Government, but support is needed. Will the Minister tell us specifically how much practical support the United Kingdom is prepared to give at this time of crisis to the emergency Government who have been established in Ramallah? A figure in round millionswill do.

Kim Howells: More than $600 million has been earmarked as support for the Palestinian people. Over the past 12 months or so, the United Kingdom will have given the best part of £70 million, which is a large sum. The hon. Gentleman says that there was a lack of support, but I doubt that very much. The Palestinian people have received huge support from not just this country, but most other countries that I know of. The dispute has been at the heart of many conflicts elsewhere. It is the one dispute that people quote at me wherever I go in the world. The world understands the centrality of solving the problem. There has not been a lack of support—certainly not financial support. The Administrations, whether they were formed by Fatah or anyone else, have been notorious for corruption. They have been inefficient and money has been filched away to bank accounts where it should never have gone. The Palestinian people have been ill served by their leaders in the past. One hopes that the crisiswill focus everyone's minds—especially, and most importantly, those of the Palestinian leaders led by President Abbas—on the fact that there must be transparency, openness and honesty and that the huge sums must be used properly for the betterment of the Palestinian people.

Kim Howells: My hon. Friend is right. The illegal settlements and the path of the wall are causing great concern and hardship for people in the occupied territories. We have told Israel many times that, if it wants peace and neighbours that it can live with, it must sort out those injustices. The path of the barrier is still a matter on which Israel could act very easily. Many of the settlements are tiny, comprisingfanatics who are armed to the teeth; they could be withdrawn to the west of the barrier. I am sure that such action would contribute significantly to easingthe great concern and sense of injustice that Palestinians feel.

Malcolm Bruce: Obviously, there can be no justification for what Hamas has done in Gaza and how it has done it; nor does it further the Palestinian cause. However, the Minister will be aware that, in January, the Select Committee on International Development published a report on development in the occupied territories that showed that extreme poverty was getting worse. More importantly, we pointed out that the isolation of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas would lead to closer links with Iran, about which he now complains. Does he accept that it will not be possible to exclude Hamas from any part of any negotiation on the future of the Palestinian territories? If there is any sort of election in future, how will the Government deal with the situation if Hamas is elected? Why did the Government not respond tothe Government of national unity, which was set up precisely to provide a means of contact with the Palestinian Authority without direct dealing with Hamas?

Kim Howells: I heard that statement, but I think that Jan Egeland talked very generally. The coup d'état, as I have called it, took everyone by surprise in its totality. Hamas has seized power, it has murdered its opponents in the most brutal fashion, and it has celebrated being entirely in control of Gaza. That is a traitorous act to the cause of the Palestinian people, and it will not benefit the notion of a viable Palestinian state. With hindsight, we can all say, "Yes, there were signs thatit might happen, and there were elements and developments pointed in that direction." However, I doubt if anyone—and the hon. Gentleman knows a great deal about the area and takes enormous interest in it—really believed that there was going to be a coup d'état that was as total in its effect as the one that we have seen in the past few days.

Sally Keeble: Ona point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am grateful forthe opportunity to raise the fact that, on 6 June in the House, I asked my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House whether we could have a ministerial statement if the Government changed the rules for restraining young people in secure training centres. He was very helpful but, last week, the Government introduced a statutory instrument that proposed wide-ranging changes without making a statement. Is it sensible, Mr. Speaker, or in order for the Ministry of Justiceto make wide-ranging proposals that affect many individuals on the rules for restraining young people in secure training centres without making a statement when one was clearly requested in the House?

Mr. Speaker: I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:
	International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) Act 2007
	Digital Switchover (Disclosure of Information)Act 2007

'(1) Part 10 of the 1983 Act (miscellaneous and supplementary) is amended as follows.
	(2) Before section 131 insert—
	"130A Independent mental health advocates
	(1) The appropriate national authority shall make such arrangements as it considers reasonable to enable persons ("independent mental health advocates") to be available to help qualifying patients.
	(2) The appropriate national authority may by regulations make provision as to the appointment of persons as independent mental health advocates.
	(3) The regulations may, in particular, provide—
	(a) that a person may act as an independent mental health advocate only in such circumstances, or only subject to such conditions, as may be specified in the regulations;
	(b) for the appointment of a person as an independent mental health advocate to be subject to approval in accordance with the regulations.
	(4) In making arrangements under this section, the appropriate national authority shall have regard to the principle that any help available to a patient under the arrangements should, so far as practicable, be provided by a person who is independent of any person who is professionally concerned with the patient's medical treatment.
	(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) above, a person is not to be regarded as professionally concerned with a patient's medical treatment merely because he is representing him in accordance with arrangements—
	(a) under section 35 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; or
	(b) of a description specified in regulations under this section.
	(6) Arrangements under this section may include provision for payments to be made to, or in relation to, persons carrying out functions in accordance with the arrangements.
	(7) Regulations under this section—
	(a) may make different provision for different cases;
	(b) may make provision which applies subject to specified exceptions;
	(c) may include transitional, consequential, incidental or supplemental provision.
	130B Arrangements under section 130A
	(1) The help available to a qualifying patient under arrangements under section 130A above shall include help in obtaining information about and understanding—
	(a) the provisions of this Act by virtue of which he is a qualifying patient;
	(b) any conditions or restrictions to which he is subject by virtue of this Act;
	(c) what (if any) medical treatment is given to him or is proposed or discussed in his case;
	(d) why it is given, proposed or discussed;
	(e) the authority under which it is, or would be, given; and
	(f) the requirements of this Act which apply, or would apply, in connection with the giving of the treatment to him.
	(2) The help available under the arrangements to a qualifying patient shall also include—
	(a) help in obtaining information about and understanding any rights which may be exercised under this Act by or in relation to him; and
	(b) help (by way of representation or otherwise) in exercising those rights.
	(3) For the purpose of providing help to a patient in accordance with the arrangements, an independent mental health advocate may—
	(a) visit and interview the patient in private;
	(b) visit and interview any person who is professionally concerned with his medical treatment;
	(c) require the production of and inspect any records relating to his detention or treatment in any hospital or registered establishment or to any after-care services provided for him under section 117 above;
	(d) require the production of and inspect any records of, or held by, a local social services authority which relate to him.
	(4) But an independent mental health advocate is not entitled to the production of, or to inspect, records in reliance on subsection (3)(c) or (d) above unless—
	(a) in a case where the patient has capacity or is competent to consent, he does consent; or
	(b) in any other case, the production or inspection would not conflict with a decision made by a donee or deputy or the Court of Protection and the person holding the records, having regard to such matters as may be prescribed in regulations under section 130A above, considers that—
	(i) the records may be relevant to the help to be provided by the advocate; and
	(ii) the production or inspection is appropriate.
	(5) For the purpose of providing help to a patient in accordance with the arrangements, an independent mental health advocate shall comply with any reasonable request made tohim by any of the following for him to visit and interview the patient—
	(a) the person (if any) appearing to the advocate to be the patient's nearest relative;
	(b) the responsible clinician for the purposes of this Act;
	(c) an approved mental health professional.
	(6) But nothing in this Act prevents the patient from declining to be provided with help under the arrangements.
	(7) In subsection (4) above—
	(a) the reference to a patient who has capacity is to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005;
	(b) the reference to a donee is to a donee of a lasting power of attorney (within the meaning of section 9 of that Act) created by the patient, where the donee is acting within the scope of his authority and in accordance with that Act;
	(c) the reference to a deputy is to a deputy appointed for the patient by the Court of Protection under section 16 of that Act, where the deputy is acting within the scope of his authority and in accordance with that Act.
	130C Section 130A: supplemental
	(1) This section applies for the purposes of section 130A above.
	(2) A patient is a qualifying patient if he is—
	(a) liable to be detained under this Act (otherwise than by virtue of section 4 or 5(2) or (4) above or section 135 or 136 below);
	(b) subject to guardianship under this Act; or
	(c) a community patient.
	(3) A patient is also a qualifying patient if—
	(a) not being a qualifying patient falling within subsection (2) above, he discusses with a registered medical practitioner or approved clinician the possibility of being given a form of treatment to which section 57 above applies; or
	(b) not having attained the age of 18 years and not being a qualifying patient falling within subsection (2) above, he discusses with a registered medical practitioneror approved clinician the possibility of being givena form of treatment to which section 58A above applies.
	(4) Where a patient who is a qualifying patient falling within subsection (3) above is informed that the treatment concerned is proposed in his case, he remains a qualifying patient falling within that subsection until—
	(a) the proposal is withdrawn; or
	(b) the treatment is completed or discontinued.
	(5) References to the appropriate national authority are—
	(a) in relation to a qualifying patient in England, to the Secretary of State;
	(b) in relation to a qualifying patient in Wales, to the Welsh Ministers.
	(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) above—
	(a) a qualifying patient falling within subsection (2)(a) above is to be regarded as being in the territory in which the hospital or registered establishment in which he is liable to be detained is situated;
	(b) a qualifying patient falling within subsection (2)(b) above is to be regarded as being in the territory in which the area of the responsible local social services authority within the meaning of section 34(3) above is situated;
	(c) a qualifying patient falling within subsection (2)(c) above is to be regarded as being in the territory in which the responsible hospital is situated;
	(d) a qualifying patient falling within subsection (3) above is to be regarded as being in the territory determined in accordance with arrangements made for the purposes of this paragraph, and published, by the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers.
	130D Duty to give information about independent mental health advocates
	(1) The responsible person in relation to a qualifying patient (within the meaning given by section 130C above) shall take such steps as are practicable to ensure that the patient understands—
	(a) that help is available to him from an independent mental health advocate; and
	(b) how he can obtain that help.
	(2) In subsection (1) above, "the responsible person" means—
	(a) in relation to a qualifying patient falling within section 130C(2)(a) above (other than one also falling within paragraph (b) below), the managers of the hospital or registered establishment in which he is liable to be detained;
	(b) in relation to a qualifying patient falling within section 130C(2)(a) above and conditionally discharged by virtue of section 42(2), 73 or 74 above, the responsible clinician;
	(c) in relation to a qualifying patient falling within section 130C(2)(b) above, the responsible local social services authority within the meaning of section 34(3) above;
	(d) in relation to a qualifying patient falling withinsection 30C(2)(c) above, the managers of the responsible hospital;
	(e) in relation to a qualifying patient falling within section 130C(3) above, the registered medical practitioneror approved clinician with whom the patient first discusses the possibility of being given the treatment concerned.
	(3) The steps to be taken under subsection (1) above shall be taken—
	(a) where the responsible person falls within subsection (2)(a) above, as soon as practicable after the patient becomes liable to be detained;
	(b) where the responsible person falls within subsection (2)(b) above, as soon as practicable after the conditional discharge;
	(c) where the responsible person falls within subsection (2)(c) above, as soon as practicable after the patient becomes subject to guardianship;
	(d) where the responsible person falls within subsection (2)(d) above, as soon as practicable after the patient becomes a community patient;
	(e) where the responsible person falls within subsection (2)(e) above, while the discussion with the patient is taking place or as soon as practicable thereafter.
	(4) The steps to be taken under subsection (1) above shall include giving the requisite information both orally and in writing.
	(5) The responsible person in relation to a qualifying patient falling within section 130C(2) above (other than a patient liable to be detained by virtue of Part 3 of this Act) shall, except where the patient otherwise requests, take such steps as are practicable to furnish the person (if any) appearing to the responsible person to be the patient's nearest relative with a copy of any information given to the patient in writing under subsection (1) above.
	(6) The steps to be taken under subsection (5) above shall be taken when the information concerned is given to the patient or within a reasonable time thereafter."
	(3) In section 134 (patients' correspondence), in subsection (3A), for paragraph (b) substitute—
	"(b) "independent advocacy services" means services provided under—
	(i) arrangements under section 130A above;
	(ii) arrangements under section 248 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 187 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006; or
	(iii) arrangements of a description prescribed as mentioned in paragraph (a) above."'.— [Ms Winterton.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	Amendment (a) to the proposed new clause, after paragraph (1), insert—
	'(1A) The appropriate national authority must ensure that help under arrangements made under subsection (1) is available to a qualifying patient from the point at which he undergoes any assessment for the purposes of this Act.'.
	Amendment (b) to the proposed new clause, in new section 130C(3)(b), at end insert
	', or is admitted to, or remains in, a hospital, or registered establishment in pursuance of such arrangements as are mentioned in section 131(1).'.
	Amendment (c) to the proposed new clause, after new section 130C(3)(b), insert—
	'(3A) A patient is also a qualifying patient if he is about to undergo, or has undergone, any assessment for the purposes of this Act.'.
	Government new clause 5— Independent mental capacity advocacy service: exceptions.
	New clause 15— Treatment requiring consent (period of time since administration of treatment)
	'(1) Section 58 of the 1983 Act is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1)(b) leave out "three months" and insert "two months".'.
	New clause 17— Nomination of carer as nearest relative
	'(1) The 1983 Act is amended as follows.
	(2) After section 26(4) insert—
	"(4A) Where a person has made an advance nomination with regard to the choice of a relative or other person to be his nearest relative, his nearest relative shall, subject to the power of the court under section 29 to appoint an acting nearest relative, be determined by giving preference to that choice.
	(4B) "Advance nomination" means a nomination made by a person ("P"), after he has reached 18 and when he has capacity to do so and in contemplation that he shall become subject to any act or decision exercisable under the provisions of this Act that his choice of nearest relative shall take precedence over the provisions of subsection (3).
	(4C) For the purposes of subsection (4B) P's nomination must be his carer as defined by section 1(1)(a) of the Carer's and Disabled Children Act 2000.
	(4D) For the purposes of section (4B) nomination cannot be made or withdrawn if P is subject to an order under this Act.
	(4E) An advance nomination is not valid if P—
	(a) has withdrawn the decision at a time when he had capacity to do so, or
	(b) has done anything else clearly inconsistent with the advance nomination remaining his fixed decision.
	(4F) An advance nomination is valid only if—
	(a) it is in writing,
	(b) it is signed by P or by another person in P's presence and by P's direction,
	(c) the signature is made or acknowledged by P in the presence of a witness, and
	(d) the witness signs it, or acknowledges his signature, in P's presence.
	(4G) The court may make a declaration as to whether an advance nomination—
	(a) exists; and
	(b) is valid.".'.
	Amendment No. 104, in clause 23, page 15, line 27, leave out 'or'.
	Amendment No. 105, in page 15, line 29, at end insert
	'because his appointment poses a risk to the health or well-being of the patient; or
	(f) that in the reasonable opinion of the patient the person is not appropriate.'.
	Government amendments Nos. 51 to 58, 60 to 66 and 68

Rosie Winterton: It is a pleasure to report backfrom the Committee after our extensive debates. It is particularly pleasurable to start with this group of amendments, as the amendments that we have tabled on advocacy are in response not only to what was said in the other place and in the detailed discussions that we had in Committee, but to the many representations that we received from organisations that have an interest in people with mental health problems having access to advocacy.
	Government new clause 3 and Government amendment No. 66 provide for advocates to be available to patients detained in hospital for assessment or treatment, to community patients and to patients subject to guardianship. In the other place and in Committee, the issue was raised of specialist advocacy for black and minority ethnic patients, child patients and patients with learning disabilities. My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier) spoke in Committee of the great benefit of specialist advocacy for patients for whom English is not their first language. The need for specialist advocacy is the reason that we have included a regulation-making power that will allow us to make different provisions for cases when it comes to the training requirements for advocates.
	As was pointed out in Committee, patients must know that they have a right to advocacy. We have provided for them to be told orally and in writing. In addition—I know this will interest the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Angela Browning)—Government amendments Nos. 52 and 61 amend the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and give the person deprived of liberty or their representative the statutory right of access to an independent mental capacity advocate to explain to them the authorisation for the deprivation of liberty and to provide support with a review or with an application to the Court of Protection. Again, these Government amendments, which reflect representations made to us, also ensure that both the person and their representative are told about the IMCA service.

Meg Hillier: It seems to me implicit in new clause 3 that an advocate should be able to speak with the patient, and should perhaps therefore be able to speak another language. Will my right hon. Friend explain her views on bilingual advocacy? It is not the same as having advocates with translations. I appreciate that it would be difficult to make an open-ended commitment to ensuring provision in every language spoken by people in my constituency, but for an advocate truly to understand the case—and this is stressed by Derman,a Turkish and Kurdish advocacy service in my constituency—they need to understand the cultural implications of someone's background.

Rosie Winterton: That is something that the hon. Gentleman will need to take up with the National Assembly for Wales. Obviously, some of those matters will be devolved. The Bill enables powers to be taken, but some of the implementation, particularly with regard to specialist advocacy, may well be covered by the Assembly.
	Section 40 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides that an IMCA is not required to be appointed in certain specified situations. Government new clause 5 and Government amendments Nos. 62 to 64 and 68 would limit the exceptions under section 40. Where someone has been appointed for matters related to property and affairs, the appointment will no longer preclude an IMCA from being instructed for health and social care matters.
	I want now to turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley), which would make changes to the Government new clause requiring advocates to be made available to patients who had not yet been detained for the purposes of assessment or treatment, and for child in-patients who were not subject to detention. I completely understand her concerns, but we need to target resources at the most vulnerable. We do not agree that it is necessarily either appropriate or workable to provide advocates to people who have not yet become subject to an application for detention, or who are not being treated under the Mental Health Act 1983, except in the specific and limited circumstances that we have set out. We must prioritise, and we believe that we have identified the priority group.
	There are also links between some of the nearest relative provisions and our intentions in introducing advocacy; I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones) sees the nearest relative as being, in a way, the patient's representative. The aim of new clause 17 and amendments Nos. 104 and 105, tabled by my hon. Friend, is to provide patients with the opportunity to have their carer appointed as their nearest relative, and to extend the grounds on which they can apply to displace a nearest relative.
	That is an issue about which there were lengthy debates in the other place, particularly about whether a patient should be able to choose their nearest relative. Those debates continued in Committee. I considered the matter extremely carefully, because I can understand the intuitive sense that it is the right approach.
	Having looked at it, however, I came to believe that it would be inappropriate to make the kind of changes that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak is suggesting—so that someone could choose a nearest relative in the same way as they would choose a direct representative or a next of a kin. We need to start from the position that the nearest relative has very particular powers under the Bill, some of which are quite specific, in respect of preventing detention and applying for discharge.
	In some of the earlier discussions on this Bill,and on previous Bills, we talked about nominated representatives, but carers groups expressed concerns particularly about the displacement of a nearest relative, which could have an effect on carers that many of us know all too well. When a person becomes extremely ill and feels that the nearest relative has the power to block detention or to discharge, it becomes too easy for that person to think that that is precisely what they should be doing. That can put many people in a difficult position. We need to realise that this is a sensitive issue.

Rosie Winterton: There is no evidence to support the proposition that the period is too long. Of course, I am aware of comments made by the Mental Health Act Commission and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, but those opinions do not constitute evidence that three months is not the most appropriate period for the SOAD to assess a patient's medication for the first time and, with the approved clinician in charge of treatment, to identify whether changes should be made to the ongoing treatment plan. As I said in Committee, the High Court has recently refused leave for a judicial review of the compatibility of the three-month period with the European convention on human rights, so it is not outside the ECHR. We do not believe that there is evidence for changing the period, and that is why we do not accept the need to do so.
	Most of all, the power exists already, and we would use it only after proper consultation with clinicians and others to decide whether it was an appropriate timeto use it. Otherwise, it could become a completely unmanageable and unsustainable change.

Rosie Winterton: I am astonished that the hon. Gentleman refers to our Bill, which has been through such distinguished discussions, as a pig in a poke. I am sure that his Front Bench will have something stern to say about that. I hope that I can reassure him that we will continue to consult fully on the Bill, particularlyon some of the regulation-making powers, not only through the procedures of the House but with clinicians and others who have shown an interest. We are anxious that the implementation be effective, so we will continue to discuss that.
	I stress that the advocacy amendments were tabled by the Government very much in response to points made in the other place, in Committee and by a number of organisations about this important issue. I am glad that we have been able to debate those as part of the first group of amendments, and I urge the House to support them.
	I ask the hon. Member for Romsey not to press her amendments, because it is important that we consider where our resources are best used, and her proposals would not be practical. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak is right to raise the issues that she does, as they are important, but to try to make some of the changes proposed would involve real problems. I undertake, however, to consider some of the issues in relation to the code of practice, and I hope to address the concerns raised. I urge the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) to withdraw his new clause, for the reasons that I have outlined.

Tim Loughton: I want to comment on two aspects of this group. First, I want to pose some questions to the Minister about advocacy. Clearly, that part of the Bill is completely new. It is a welcome new addition, but it is a reappearance, because advocacy services were promised by the Government in the 2004 draft. That was very much welcomed by the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee, which raised practical questions with the Minister about it. She has now included the provision, but it could have been included in the first place, which would have enabled the Committee to consider the finer print, and saved us further debate here.
	Advocacy is essential in three main areas: to ensurea statutory right to an independent mental health advocate for all patients subject to compulsory powers; to make patients aware of that right, which the Minister has touched on; and to ensure, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Angela Browning) pointed out, that patients have a right to meet their advocate in private. Those are fundamental human rights that should be made available as part of the service.
	The advocates will be essential, providing supportto vulnerable people in exercising their rights toappeal against decisions made for their treatment or confinement: for example, as a way of communicating their interests when they may lack capacity to do sofor themselves. That service should be provided, particularly for the most vulnerable patients, and prioritised at the point of crisis. The issue of the availability of culturally competent advocacy has also been raised. In particular, the black and minority ethnic mental health communities have pointed to the importance of suitable advocacy for their members.
	The pre-legislative scrutiny Committee questioned the Minister's estimated costings. The regulatory impact assessment estimated the whole-time equivalent of 140 advocates at a cost of approximately £5 million. We seriously questioned whether the Minister had made a very conservative and inadequate estimate. We need to be convinced that the service will be workable, viable and sustainable, not just a token effort to make available a few—but not nearly enough—advocates. Has the Minister reviewed the costings?

Tim Loughton: The hon. Gentleman has raised that issue before, and has been a big advocate of advocates for some time. The point he makes is right. It also touches on how the advocates should be overseen and quality-controlled. Again, the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee suggested that the Mental Health Act Commission should be engaged to set the standard for the advocates. If we are to have advocates, we need to ensure that they know what they are doing, and are of a sufficient standard to do what can be a technical job dealing with technical parts of the law, as all of us who have been involved with the Bill for some years, and on the Committee for the past few weeks, know.
	What has been learned from the Mental Capacity Act 2005 about the use of advocates? I know, from when the Minister and I discussed a statutory instrument to extend the pilot for advocates provided under that Act, that they have gone down well. At that time I raised the great inconsistency: if they worked well for people covered by that Act, why on earth were we not having them in this legislation—as we now are? I should like to hear some comments on that. We support what the Government are introducing, and merely question whether the measure is sufficiently resourced and structured for it to be as successful as we all want it to be. However, I certainly commend the Government for introducing it.
	The Minister pre-empted some of my comments on new clause 15, although she did not answer my questions about it, which I fear was also the case when we raised the subject in Committee. This is important because it is all about respecting the wishes of vulnerable patients and considering the effect of treatment on them, giving them an opportunity to engage in their treatment, and ensuring that there are thorough checks and balances so that people with serious medical conditions get the right medical treatment. Given the serious effects of medication and the possibility of patients being given too high a dose without their consent, even despite their active opposition to medication, we must ensure that we getit right.
	As the Minister said, the new clause would amend section 58 of the Mental Health Act 1983 by reducing from three months to two the time before a second medical opinion is required for medication. The Joint Committee on Human Rights—its Chairman is not in the Chamber, but I am sure that he will be joiningour deliberations because he has tabled later amendments—proposed that the time should be reduced from three months to one. We are proposing a compromise, as we did in Committee, to reduce it from three months to two months in stages. The Joint Committee had serious concerns, which again the Minister has not allayed.
	The second opinion appointed doctor will assess types of medication, the doses of medication and the combination of different medications. We are talking about powerful chemical cocktails. They have the capacity to bring about serious side effects, such as obesity, diabetes, impotence and movement disorders. It is essential that we take the patient's feelings into account and ensure that we have good practice.
	We also made the case in Committee that patients in that condition should be subject to more regular physical health checks for their own benefit, simply because of the physical effects that many of the powerful drugs have on them. We are joined in that request by the Mental Health Act Commission, which has raised on several occasions, and in at least two of its reports, its concerns about how the period of three months works in practice. In its last biennial report, for 2003-05, it said:
	"Too many patients feel that they are excluded from decision making and the exercise of choice in their hospital treatment and unable to discuss their subjective experiences of therapeutic effect or adverse side-effects. This is likely to exacerbate the likelihood of non-compliance after discharge and may contribute to the problems of revolving-door readmissions".
	It is not good for patients' therapy or recovery to feel excluded in that way.
	The MHAC says that when visiting hospitals it has found that medical treatment is a key issue for patients, and it often receives complaints about it. In its most recent report it listed complaints about, for instance,
	"No record of discussion with patient regarding proposed treatment...No record of assessment of patient's capacity to consent to treatment... Patients telling visiting Commissioners that they are not happy taking their medication".
	As the Minister knows, a patient's diagnosis is not straightforward and may change several times over a period of detention. We think that three months of being treated without consent, or with a lack of capacity to consent to treatments that may be causing harm, is simply too long. In 2004-05, 18 per cent. of patients' plans were changed as a result of SOAD intervention, but as the MHAC reported, that is not an accurate indicator of the importance of the role.
	There is an extra incentive for doctors to get it right. As the MHAC says,
	"the SOAD provides a check on the RMO's practice"
	—"RMO" stands for "registered medical officer—
	"and by the very nature of the oversight provided by the Second Opinion ensures that RMOs give careful thought to their decisions. We believe that if this provision had not been available there would have been no check on the appropriateness of treatment, and many more treatment plans could have been the subject of formal complaint."
	The Minister has already taken up my point that the 1983 Act provides a power, under order, to vary the time. We have had 24 years in which to do that, but it has not been done. The MHAC says
	"We believe that the current Act provides insufficient protection to patients in the first three months of their treatment under detention, when they may be forcibly given medication in doses or combinations that are outside of product guidelines and recommendations without the oversight of a Second Opinion Appointed Doctor. Some RMOs appear to share our unease: we receive...occasional requests for statutory Second Opinions in relation to such patients".
	The Minister addressed that point a moment ago without answering it, or at least, she answered it completely the wrong way. She said that the Government agreed with those concerns, and that that was why tribunals that they had intended to establish under the draft Mental Health Bill of 2004 would have had power to step in after 28 days. This is nothing to do with cost-effectiveness, or with our practical complaints that people were not available to man the tribunals. The principle was that the conditions should be examined after 28 days. Our complaint was that the mechanics would not be practicable. If the principle was right then, why are the Government reverting to a three-month period? That is the question that the Minister has not answered.
	In Committee, the Minister said that the system would be too bureaucratic and might involve up to 8,000 more SOAD hours. There would be a big cost and resource implication. Mat Kinton is undertaking further research for the MHAC, which is not yet finished but is soon to be published. We have been given permission to quote from it. Mr. Kinton conducted a survey of the 14,574 patients detained at 31 March 2006, just over a year ago. He was able to examine just over 81 per cent. of them in detail. Working on the Government's figures, he established that if the three-month rule had been a two-month rule, 3,598 patients, or 30.5 per cent. of the total number admitted to hospital under Mental Health Act powers, could have received a second opinion. Thatis an additional 337 opinions and an increase in second-opinion activity of slightly over 10 per cent., which amounts to nothing like 8,000 additionalSOAD hours.
	I believe that the Government's estimates are woefully wrong. I am surprised that the Minister has not been contacted the MHAC, given the serious concerns that it has raised on a number of occasions. The Minister's figures are wrong; but, more importantly, the principle that someone should not be forced to wait for three months on medication that may not be appropriate—regardless of the physical, let alone the mental effect—is fundamentally wrong.
	Our suggestion is not radical; it is a compromise solution—to reduce the period from three months to two months. Many people think that the period should be shorter than that. It is a practical suggestionand, more importantly, it addresses the principle of respecting the wishes of people with mental illness. It makes sure that they are engaged properly in their treatment, rather than potentially cut adrift from having any say in it for three months until a SOAD is appointed. On that basis, I am minded to press our new clause to a Division at the appropriate time, rather than to withdraw it as the Minister requested.

David Kidney: Indeed, and as I explained on Second Reading, a hospital in my constituency specialises in eating disorder cases, and some of the children who attend it are extremely young. In Committee, we debated age-appropriate facilities for children, and learned of a child as young as 10 who was in very inappropriate accommodation when receiving in-patient hospital treatment. So yes, those children can be very young and very vulnerable.
	I want to say a little about nearest relatives and carers. Between consideration in Committee and today, my right hon. Friend the Minister and I corresponded on this subject, and I am disappointed at not having made any progress. There is one issue that I would like to bring to the head of my wish list: I want the Minister at least to look again at the definition of a carer. At the moment, we are reliant on the 1983 Act, which says that a carer is somebody who has been caring for five years, which then gets them on to the nearest relative list. If they are living with the patient at the time that such services are required, they can go to the top of that list. However, the position of carers has moved on a long way since 1983. Since then, there has been a Labour Government—since 1997—and we have the country's first ever national strategy for carers andthe first dedicated funding for carers, rather thanfor the people whom they care for. We have also established for the first time an entitlement for a carer to have an assessment of their needs, rather than of the person whom they care for.
	So the definition of a carer today is very different from simply being someone who has lived with a person for five years. Of course, many carers do not live with the person whom they care for, even though they are their full-time carer, so I would argue that we still need to look at the definition of carer. I understand why my right hon. Friend the Minister is not attracted to new clause 17, but it does at least bring up to date the definition of a carer, in line with the legislation introduced in 2000, which is the latest to deal with carers.
	I turn to my final point on the ability to nominate someone to be the nearest relative. I have read the correspondence that my right hon. Friend sent to me and I accept all the arguments, but I ask whether there is one last option—one quite similar to that given in a briefing that we received from the Law Society. Here, I should declare another interest as a non-practising solicitor. If the person in question could nominate from a closed list, rather than an open one, would that get round the problems associated with the European convention on human rights that my right hon. Friend mentioned? If the closed list could simply be the nearest relative list with an updated definition of a carer included, could not the person in question—when they are not subject to the powers under the 1983 Act—at least nominate somebody from that list in order to bring them to the top of it, rather than somebody who is completely outside that list? That is my last suggestion for the Minister, and I hope that it is of some help.

Sandra Gidley: It would be churlish of me not to welcome the Government new clauses and amendments. As the Minister suspected, amendments (a) to (c) to new clause 3 are an attempt to see whether she can be pushed just a little further. I take on board the points made about resources. Indeed, a briefing from the NHS Confederation, which most Members present today will have received, raises concerns about the resourcing of this service, and points out that patients have to know about its availability. So I take on board the point that we should see how things progress and then potentially go further.
	I shall briefly outline why it was important to table the amendments. I am sure that the Minister is aware that a disproportionate number of black and minority ethnic people are sectioned. It is a particular problem for the Afro-Caribbean community, which experiences more instances of over-medication, misdiagnosis and control and restraint. They are more likely to be detained as long-term patients, which increases the need for access to advocates before sectioning. That is the driver behind amendments (a) and (c).
	In Committee, the Minister glossed over my comments about a race equality impact assessment for the Bill. It is not enough to assume that all will be treated equally under the Bill, because that does not happen at the moment and there is nothing in the Bill to suggest that it will change matters. If one section of society has different outcomes, that is a problem that needs to be addressed in some shape or form and the amendments are an attempt to address it.
	There has been a history of misunderstandingand discrimination against black and minority ethnic people, resulting in the death of several Afro-Caribbean service users under the care of the mental health system. The most famous case is that of David "Rocky" Bennett, which was the subject of an independent inquiry by Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire health authority. The inquiry's report made 22 recommendations. The key underpinning theme of those recommendations was that there should be ministerial acknowledgement of the presence of institutional racism in the mental health services and a commitment to eliminate it. It is never pleasant to have to admit something like that, but the figures speak for themselves.
	A study has also found that there are circles of fear that stop black people from engaging with services. They do not access help early because they are concerned about what will happen to them. The study found that Afro-Caribbeans were often not treated with respect and the services were not accessible, welcoming, relevant or well integrated with the community. The way in which Afro-Caribbean people enter mental health services is problematic and influences the nature and outcomes of treatment.
	Most importantly, different models of description of mental illness and other people's philosophies or world views are not understood or even acknowledged. That is a double-edged sword, because the flipside is that the concept of culture has been used to attempt to address some of those issues, but it can also divert professionals from looking at the patient as an individual, with their own characteristics, history and needs. Assumptions can be made on the basis of race, and that is wrong.
	Those and other findings were supported by the "Inside Outside" report and the "Breaking the Circles of Fear" report. A recent Mental Health Act Commission census also backed them up. The amendments attempt to address some of the problems, because if advocacy is available at the beginning of the process, an appropriate advocate could be found who could ensure fairer treatment.
	The Minister was concerned about the overall financial impact of the amendments, but if she is serious about addressing the problems of racism, she could consider a pilot scheme in a relevant area to see whether structured access to advocacy services and greater cultural awareness help to break down some of the barriers and reduce the statistics. I hope that the Minister will look into that—

Sandra Gidley: I do not want to go into individual cases. The example that I cited was not the best example of the effect of a lack of advocacy services at the beginning because there was clearly a mental health problem in that case. I raised that case, however, because of the report that highlighted the problems experienced by many service users. It is fair to say that several Afro-Caribbeans would not be sectioned or subjected to electro-convulsive therapy if there was more understanding of their culture and needs.
	I will not press amendments (a) and (c) to newclause 3 to a Division because of the wider implications, but I hope that the Minister will take on board the nature of the specific problem and bring something forward to move us in a fairer direction in the longer term.
	Amendment (b) to Government new clause 3 would do something similar for children by extending the terms of the measure to make mental health advocacy available for all children who are voluntary patients, rather than just children liable to detention, or for whom ECT is being contemplated. I do not buy into the Minister's argument about resources because estimates show that the measure would probably affect only 650 children a year, or one in each constituency. The numbers are not high, yet we should provide an extra safeguard for those children. It must be terrifying for a child to be admitted to an in-patient unit, especially, as is frequently the case, if their relationship with their parents has broken down. An advocate would be someone other than a parent, carer or clinician who could not only communicate with the child, but communicate that child's interests and ensure that there was a right of appeal.
	Children can overturn parental responsibility only through a court order, so the system is completely stacked against them. We are talking about only a small number of people, yet they are vulnerable and at a crucial time of their lives, so although the Bill does much to improve conditions for children, I urge the Minister to think again on this matter. Given that I have heard supportive comments from Labour Members, I am minded to press amendment (b) to new clause 3 to a Division.

Lynne Jones: Like everyone who has spoken, I warmly welcome the Government new clauses and amendments and the increased safeguards for vulnerable people that will be introduced through the arrangements for advocacy. The new clause and amendments that I have tabled would improve the arrangements by which the nearest relative could be displaced, if necessary. The Bill contains a measure that allows for that, but it is problematic because it requires a patient to go to court and due to the grounds set out on which a nearest relative may be displaced.
	New clause 17 is based on an amendment tabled in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney). It would avoid court proceedings by allowing a patient to give an advance directive of the name of the nearest relative. As my right hon. Friend the Minister said, the appointment of the nearest relative is extremely important. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford pointed out in Committee, there is all too often no nearest relative who is willing to perform that role. If someone suitable is available, it is thus important that it is as easy as possible for a patient to appoint that person as the nearest relative.
	My new clause differs somewhat from the original measure tabled by my hon. Friend because I have attempted to address several concerns expressed by the Government. I realise that it would not be appropriate to allow frivolous changes or appointments of the nearest relative, so my amendment would confine the appointment or changed appointment as the nearest relative to the carer. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford pointed out, a carer is someone who is not living with the patient, but who has their best interests at heart, spends a great deal of time with them and knows their case, and is someone whom the patientcan trust.
	At various meetings, we have had put to us examples of people who have no contact whatever with their relatives, but who would find the prospect of a court process to displace them somewhat daunting. I am disappointed that the Government cannot find a way to make provision that enables the nearest relative to be changed without going to court, although I am pleased by the Minister's assurance that she intends to make the system as user friendly as possible. Of course, it is not necessary for the patient to take the action themselves; they can be supported in doing so, or the process can be carried out on their behalf.
	Amendments Nos. 104 and 105 are designed to make it possible to seek displacement on broader grounds than the Bill allows. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has criticised the provisions of the Bill and the associated code of practice, saying that they are too narrow to enable the nearest relative to be displaced unless there is some undercurrent of abuse. That important point must be addressed, and I am grateful that the Minister is willing to consider the code of practice and to discuss further whether those concerns can be properly dealt with.
	As the relative of someone who has been very ill and undergone the process of sectioning, I am well aware of the concern of nearest relatives that they should not easily be set aside. I know that, at times of crisis, patients can turn against family members—the people who are most concerned about them. I therefore understand the Government's concerns, but I hope that they will do all they can to address the worry that lies behind new clause 17 and amendments Nos. 104and 105.

David Kidney: Before everybody loses sight of the fact, I point out that proposed new clause 130B(3)(a) innew clause 3 says that the independent mental health advocate may
	"visit and interview the patient in private".

Angela Browning: I appreciate that, but I felt that the Minister was praying in aid the code of practice in her response to me, and I just wanted some clarification on that issue. Finally, I want to pick up on a point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones): when we consider the nearest relative and carer, we should remember that they are often one and the same person, and that is quite a difficult situation, not least in the situation that she identified. Sometimes, if the patient lives with their nearest relative, or their nearest relative is also their primary carer, a situation develops in which that relative becomes personally involved in assisting the medical profession to section someone close to them. That can trigger a reaction on the part of the patient. I hope that the Minister will consider those situations and willbe flexible enough to identify them on a case-by-case basis.
	However, the Minister faces a dilemma, because it is not an easy issue to resolve. In the Bournewood case, the nearest relative of HL—an autistic adult who was detained—did not have day-to-day knowledge of HL's condition. It was actually the paid professional carer who had that knowledge, and it would have been much more helpful if the carer had been involved at a much earlier stage. I appreciate that it is a difficult point for the Minister, but I hope that the system will be robust, yet flexible enough to allow difficult circumstances to be built into the changes that she is introducing.

Meg Hillier: Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker; I am glad to know that it is not just me who makes that kind of slip occasionally. I welcome new clause 3, whichis comprehensive and which goes quite a long way towards tackling some of the issues that cause me concern. I look forward to seeing the regulations, and I know that the Hackney organisations with which I am involved will want to contribute to the process, particularly with regard to issues of language and cultural awareness, which were raised by the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley). Those arehuge issues in a constituency such as mine, where300 languages are spoken, and where all the inequalities that affect the mental health of people of many different ethnic groups are highlighted to an extreme. I hope that new clause 3 and the regulations will help to pave the way for greater advocacy for people, both pre-detention and post detention. I raised that matter through probing amendments in Committee. The new clause sets out a good way forward for extending rights of advocacy.
	I cannot end without touching on the issue of resources, because under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the whole of Hackney—not just my constituency, but that of my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), too—received £40,000 for support for those who are unbefriended. I hope that in our debates on that subject we realistically consider the issue of resources. It is worth reminding Members that 12 of the top 20 users of accident and emergency services at my local hospital, Homerton University hospital, were known to mental health trusts; they were the most frequent users of those accident and emergency services, so the advocacy issues are important for a number of reasons. I have highlighted some of the issues that I have already discussed in Committee, so I will not detain the House any further.

Hywel Williams: I, too, welcome the proposals on advocacy, but I am concerned to ensure that advocacy services in Wales are widely available in both Welsh and English. The reason why I intervened on the Minister earlier and asked whether advocates would be assumed to be working for a public authority is that public bodies in Wales are subject to the Welsh Language Act 1993, and must produce language schemes. That might ensure that help was available in Welsh or English, as required. My second point is that if advocates are employed by a public authority, the system shouldbe set up on an entirely bilingual basis. I refer the Minister to the way in which the post of Children's Commissioner for Wales was set up by Peter Clarke. That started out properly on a bilingual footing.
	I refer the Minister to the recent speculation in Wales that the new Welsh Assembly Government might seek a legislative competency in mental health. One of the reasons for that would be to ensure that the service was available in Welsh. Commenting on that, the First Minister, Rhodri Morgan, said that although he was sympathetic to the proposal, he was concerned about whether undevolved aspects of legislation could be disentangled. Some subjects are properly the concern of Parliament, but some are properly the concern of the Assembly. That may be resolved by new clause 3(2), which states:
	"The appropriate national authority shall make such arrangements as it considers reasonable"
	to enable people to act as advocates. Will the Minister confirm that, to her mind, that requires whoever sets up the advocacy system in Wales to ensure that the system is bilingual from the outset?

Rosie Winterton: I will respond briefly to the points that have been made. First, on the issue raised by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier), we have taken on board the points made during pre-legislative scrutiny about the estimates for advocacy. We are still working on the costings, but when the Bill hopefully completes its passage through the Commons, we will be able to produce an updated regulatory impact assessment before the Lords consider the Commons amendments. I hope that that will improve the position outlined by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham.
	Turning to the point that the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Angela Browning) made about privacy, proposed new section 130B already includes provisions for an advocate to meet the patient in private, and I assure the hon. Lady that we will expand on that in the code of practice. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) for his comments, as I know that he is concerned about the issue, particularly the question of advocacy and the nearest relative. I can assure him that proper information about rights will be made available. We always keep those issues under consideration. As for the position of the nearest relative, anyone living with the patient for five years will be placed on the list, as he knows, and anyone living with, or caring for, a patient will be moved to the top of the list. We have therefore tried to make sure that carers are properly defined and treated in the same way that they are treated under other legislation.
	The hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) rightly raised the issue of black and minority ethnic patients. As I have set out, we have taken a series of actions under "Delivering race equality in mental health care" but, as I tried to stress at the outset, we are considering specialist advocacy for people from BME communities. I reiterate that it is important to confine advocacy to the groups that have been set out. I very much welcome the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones) about the fact that we need to make sure that, when we look at the issue of the nearest relative, we involve the relevant people to ensure that the code of practice is right. I thank her for her understanding of the issues that we have tried to tackle. As I have said, I wanted to see whether there was anything further that we can do, but I am convinced that with the exception of the question of looking at the code of practice and so on—I will keep in touch with her on that—we have found the right way forward. I will write to the hon. Member for Caernarfon (Hywel Williams) about the issue of the Welsh language. As I have said before, essentially, this is a question about devolving the issue to the Welsh Assembly. As he said, it is about the Welsh language, too, but I will make sure that Ministers in Wales are aware of his comments.
	Finally, I welcome the support given during the debate to our proposals on advocacy. I regret that I still cannot agree to the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham because I do not think it is practical and we already have the power that we need to make the changes. Of course I will look at the evidence from MHAC, but we would have to be clear that the proposal was properly evidence based. For that reason I ask the House not to support the new clause if the hon. Gentleman decides to press it to a vote later.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Rosie Winterton: I shall be brief, as I fully expect the amendments to be supported in all parts of the House. They deal with safeguards for patients who are to be treated for their mental disorder with electroconvulsive therapy, or ECT. The issue was debated at length in the other place and in Committee. ECT is an invasive procedure and some patients are fearful of it. Although it is an established psychiatric treatment, it is a controversial one.
	We have already introduced amendments in the other place under which the refusal of a detained patient, with capacity to consent, to consent to ECT should be respected, except in an emergency. Following further debate in which other concerns were raised,the amendments before us provide even stronger safeguards in the very rare circumstances where young persons are treated with ECT. In Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, North (Dr. Gibson) was particularly concerned about the provisions for giving ECT in emergencies. I hope he welcomes the changes that we have made.
	The amendments also clarify the position for community patients. Government amendment No. 12 ensures that, for patients under 18 who agree to treatment with ECT, a second opinion appointed doctor must first certify that it is appropriate for the ECT to be given. Even where a young patient consents to treatment, we want a second opinion. We have also considered the needs of patients under 18 who arenot detained under the legislation or subject to a community treatment order. Government amendments Nos. 16, 21, 25 and 27 require that, where such patients can lawfully be treated with ECT or any other treatment made subject to section 58A, a second opinion appointed doctor must certify that it is appropriate. This is an important new safeguard for voluntary patients under 18.
	The Mental Health Act 1983 provides for a limited number of circumstances where the patient can be urgently treated without the need for a statutory second opinion. We have reconsidered those circumstances in the light of requests to do so in the other place and in Committee. As a result, we have concluded that ECT may be given as an urgent treatment in only two circumstances: where it is immediately necessary to save the patient's life, or to prevent a serious deterioration in the patient's condition. Amendment No. 19 achieves that, and we have made similar amendments—amendments Nos. 36, 37, 41 and 42—to the urgent procedures for community patients. Obviously, ECT is rarely administered to patients who are not hospital in-patients. The Bill does not afford community patients the same safeguards, and to rectify that we have tabled amendments Nos. 29 to 34, 39, 43 and 46.
	We have tabled other technical amendments. Amendment No. 14 removes the requirement that the second opinion appointed doctor certify that the giving of treatment does not conflict with the court order. Amendment No. 28 makes it clear that the certificates for adult community patients and child community patients apply when a patient is recalled to hospital, or when their community treatment order is revoked. Amendment No. 45 provides that the authority that issues a SOAD certificate under part 4A may require the approved clinician in charge of that treatment to report on it.
	As I said, I think that the amendments will be supported by all hon. Members, and I recommend them to the House.

John Pugh: We discovered in Committee that two Committee members had helped to administer this treatment at one time or another. We all understand that ECT is highly invasive, involves sedation, inflicts fits, leads to amnesia and can involve physical restraint, the removal of false teeth and so on. Like acupuncture, it is a treatment that is hard to explain. In a letter, the Minister explained that it is used in a rather strange diversity of cases. For under-18s, it has been used for anorexia, depression, bipolar disease, schizophrenia and obsessive compulsive disorder. It works in some of those cases, albeit temporarily, and although it is addictive its long-term effects do not seem to be conclusively bad. As it is so invasive, it needs to be used with exceptional care. Some consultantswill not use it at all, and for others it is a last resort.Its appropriate use therefore needs to be heavily circumscribed for all, not only for under-18s.
	The Bill contains definite limitations. For example, the clinician must certify
	"in writing that the patient is capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects of the treatment".
	I doubt that anyone in the UK truly understands the nature, purpose and full likely effect of the treatment, but none the less that is a useful set of words.The Minister has added further words—no fewer than 17 new clauses—so we cannot complain and we will support the changes.

James Duddridge: The Minister is correct to predict that Members on both sides of the House are likely to support the amendments, although that is no surprise given that the Bill has been 10 years in gestation. Throughout that time concerns about ECT have been raised, not only in pre-legislative scrutiny, but in the other place and in amendments tabled in Committee.
	The Minister correctly said that ECT is a controversial and quite invasive procedure. In Committee, I probed her about cases involving those under 18. On 12 June, she kindly wrote to me with a sample of the number of people under 18 who were subject to the procedure during a three-month period in 2002. She said that only four people under 18 had been administered ECT, and that none of those was under 16. Perhaps she could look again at those figures, because I note that the Mental Health Alliance briefing contradicts her letter and says that one individual under 16 was included. I am concerned about those under 18 because in the early adolescent periods the brain develops in ways that we do not understand. We are forcing a treatment that we do not fully understand on the bodies of young, vulnerable individuals at a time when the other major organs of the body are still developing. A number of people die following ECT, and I am concerned about those under 16, whose organs are still developing.
	I welcome the amendments, particularly those introducing the requirement for SOADs and extending safeguards to those under 18 who admit themselves voluntarily. I have a question for the Minister about when parents do not agree on what should happen to their child. If they do not feel able to respond by going ahead with ECT, they can go to the High Court; but what happens if the parents are in dispute? Would the case go automatically to the High Court?
	I am also a little confused about amendmentsNos. 41 and 42. Amendment No. 41 appears to delete a large section of text that is simply put back by amendment No. 42. It might simply be a matter of drafting, and getting the order of provisions right, but I should be grateful if the Minister explained the reasons for deleting one amendment and repeating the same form of words in amendment No. 42.
	Finally, given the confusion about the number of people under 18—and particularly those under 16—who have had ECT treatments, would the Minister consider reporting to the House, or making some formal report, on how many people are subject to ECT each year, to monitor whether the number goes up or down, and with a focus on under-16s, as well as those under 18?
	Having made those points, I welcome the amendments and congratulate the Minister on tabling them.

Rosie Winterton: I thank the hon. Member for Southport (Dr. Pugh) for his contribution; as hesaid, when the matter was debated in Committeethe different experiences of some Committee members were recounted, which showed how expert the Committee was. Their knowledge was brought to bear on our deliberations, and it certainly helped to swing the argument in favour of introducing the new safeguards.
	I shall have to write to the hon. Member for Rochford and Southend, East (James Duddridge) about the technical point concerning the wording. I believe that the Mental Health Act Commission might be looking at the number of people who receive ECT, but, again, I shall write to the hon. Gentleman to clarify the point. I thank him, and all members of the Committee and other Members of the House, for the warm welcome they gave the amendments.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Rosie Winterton: The new clause, new schedule and amendment relate to the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. They extend the rights of victims of mentally disordered offenders to receive information and make representations about a patient's discharge. I pay particular tribute to the work of the Zito Trust and Victims Voice, with whom we had several meetings, who have made strong representations about extending the rights of victims in such tragic circumstances. Ialso pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friends the Members for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart), who has been very involved in the issue, and for Bridgend (Mrs. Moon), who raised it in Committee. I am glad to say that I think that the provisions will have cross-party support, showing the importance that Parliament attaches to treating victims with respect and dignity. Those issues were debated in Committee and the other place, and we introduced amending provisions in response to those debates.
	The amending provisions relate to persons with a mental disorder who have been convicted of a criminal offence of a sexual or violent nature, but who are not made subject to restrictions. Unlike the victims of offenders given restricted orders, these victims are not told when the offender is discharged from detention in hospital. In responding to the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee report on the 2004 draft Bill, we saidthat we would consider how victims' rights might be extended to cover victims of serious offences whereno restrictions had been imposed. The amending provisions also help to deliver that commitment.
	The Government believe that the key ways of helping victims of crime are through support services, allowing victims' voices to be heard in court and providing information, which can take several forms. For example, there is information on where to seek help and advice; on the progress of a case from the point of report through to the end of the criminal case; andon when the offender is released. Much of that was included in the code of practice for victims of crime, which set out for the first time the obligations of the criminal justice system towards victims.
	It is also important to recognise that we looked into how to extend victims' rights further. We shall table amendments that reflect discussions on the importance of information about what has happened to restricted patients, but we are also extending provisions to include circumstances where patients are not restricted. Many victims' organisations have stressed to us the importance of sharing information between agencies, and we must recognise that.
	The draft illustrative code of practice, at chapter 34A, deals with public bodies' sharing of information in order to address risk. It is important to acknowledge that some considerations need to be taken into account where confidentiality is crucial, and patients are entitled to know that their rights will be respected to that extent, but it is also important to recognise that many victims' organisations made it very clear to us that information about risk should be shared between different agencies—even when the information is about someone detained under the Mental Health Act. We will consult further on the draft code of practice and information sharing so that we can consider bolstering our guidance. As I said, patients have a right to confidentiality, but the public have a right to know that systems and services are in place to support people with a mental disorder.
	Victims need to know when an offender has been released in order to reassure them about their future safety. The amending provisions are designed to extend to more victims the protections put in place by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, which sets out the current rights of victims of mentally disordered offenders.
	Under that Act, victims are entitled to receive information where the following apply: first, where a person is convicted of a violent or sexual offence; secondly, when he receives a hospital order or a hospital direction, or is transferred from prison to hospital under a transfer direction; and, thirdly, where he is made subject to special restrictions, respectively a restriction order, a limitation direction or a restriction direction. If those circumstances apply, the victim has the right to elect to receive information about the patient's discharge from hospital; to make representations about whether the patient should be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge; and to receive information about the discharge and any conditions imposed for the victim's protection.
	The amending provisions extend those very important rights to victims of mentally disordered offenders who are convicted of violent or sexual offences, but not made subject to special restrictions. The process will be similar to the current one for offenders who receive restricted hospital orders. The local probation board must take reasonable steps to establish whether a victim wishes to make representations about whether the patient should be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge from hospital. It must also establish whether the victim wishes to receive information about any conditions to which the patient is subject in the event of his discharge from hospital.
	Where the victim so wishes, the probation board must notify the relevant hospital managers of the victim's wish and their name and address, so that they may be contacted. Should the victim wish to rescind their request for information or notify the board of any change in their contact details, the board must notify him of the contact details for the hospital manager. A victim who initially declines to make representations or receive information, but changes their mind, may contact the local probation board.
	To facilitate the making of representations, the responsible clinician is required to inform hospital managers whether he is considering discharging a patient, making a community treatment order or varying the conditions of an order. There is a duty to inform hospital managers when any other person is considering discharging the patient under section 23(3), and when an application is made to the mental health review tribunal. On receipt of such information, hospital managers must notify the victim that discharge is being considered, giving the victim the opportunity to make representations if they wish.
	Hospital managers must forward representations to those who have the power to consider the patient's discharge from detention, or discharge on a community treatment order. The responsible clinician must inform hospital managers whether a patient is to be discharged or a community treatment order is to be made. If so, managers must be told whether any of the conditions in the order relate to contact with the victim or their family. The clinician must also notify them of whether any conditions relating to the victim or their family are to be altered or added. Finally, he must notify them if a community treatment order is to cease to be in force, and the date on which it is to cease, and if the conditions for a patient's authority for detention are no longer met.
	A person who is to discharge a patient under section 23(3) must also inform hospital managers, as must the tribunal if it directs that a patient is to be discharged. When hospital managers receive this information, they must take all reasonable steps to pass it to the victim. They may also provide such other information as they consider appropriate. The same notification requirements will apply when a victim has elected to make representations, or to receive information about a person subject to a hospital order with restrictions, and the restriction order is lifted while the hospital order remains in force. Those rights will also apply to the victims of persons made subject to a hospital and limitation direction where the direction ceases to have effect, and in cases where convicted persons are transferred to hospital under a transfer direction without a restriction direction, or where the restriction direction is removed.
	As I said, many organisations representing victims, particularly the Zito Trust and Victims Voice, have campaigned for these provisions for a number of years, so I am glad that we have been able to introduce them in the Bill. It is the right thing to do and I am grateful for the support that I hope will be given from both sides of the House. The amendments are important and will send a real message of our support.

Tim Loughton: I shall speak briefly in support of the new clause, which my hon. Friends and I signed. Although we did not have the opportunity to discuss the proposals in Committee, they are welcome andI wholly concur with the Minister's comments. We should certainly treat with respect and dignity the victims of horrendous and tragic crimes, about some of which we are only too well aware. I pay tribute both to the organisations mentioned by the Minister and to the others that have lobbied long and hard for respect for victims' rights.
	We hear much about some of the horrendous cases, but they need to be put into perspective, as I am sure the Minister agrees. We need balance, but we need to make sure that the victims of those crimes are properly respected and that the horrendous blow they have suffered is dealt with as sensitively as possible and the situation is not exacerbated in the future. They have to go on living with the injuries—or, in extreme cases, the fatalities—that may have occurred. We need to think about victims, and the proposals are a good, if belated, way of adding the same safeguards as those in the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act and for other victims of crime.
	The biggest tribute we can pay to victims and, we hope, to avoid there being more of them in future, is to make sure we do everything possible to stop perpetrators before they commit such ghastly acts. That is what the Bill and mental health services are all about—making sure that people who are a danger to themselves and others are picked up at an early stage and given the treatment they need and deserve for their medical condition. We need to get that balance right.
	Such crimes have an impact on families, too. I have spoken to the victims of patients and of others suffering from mental illness. For innocent families who have had no connection with the mental health services, it can be hard to come to terms with sucha most shocking blow. In extreme circumstances, professional staff and others working in mental health services can also be the victims of patients when their condition gets out of control. We need to think about those sets of victims and their families.
	As the Minister said, we have a duty to offer victims support services. Some of the organisations in my constituency do an excellent job in that regard and we should give them every support to do more.
	Victims need a voice in court. I agree with the Minister: too often, that is an unheard and forgotten part of the equation. Most importantly, victims need information about the progress of the case, and the whereabouts of the perpetrator and their likely release date—in a safe situation, we hope, so that they donot commit other atrocities in the future. Sharing information between agencies is absolutely essential, so I hope that in drawing up powers on victims' rights, the Minister is equally mindful of the structures necessary to implement them. There should be constant monitoring to ensure that information is shared. Victims need to know when offenders are released so that they can take due care for their security and peace of mind if there is an outstanding problem. They have suffered one tragic blow; it would be unreasonable to expect them to suffer a second by not giving them the information that a perpetrator may be at large—albeit, we hope, after appropriate treatment, so that their condition does not recur.
	On behalf of the Opposition, I welcome the provisions and I am sure that the Minister will do all she can to ensure that they do not just go into legislation but are realistically put into practice as soon as possible, so that victims have long overdue support.

John Pugh: It is estimated that a large number of prisoners have mental illness, which is to be expected because prison is not an enjoyable experience. Some are treatable in prison, but some are beyond its competence to treat them, as would be the case if they had severe physical problems, so transfer may be necessary. That may be problematic because of security problems, the effect on autonomy and rehabilitation, and the prisoner's understanding of his position. However, when the situation is severe, there is no option but to transfer.
	The purpose of the new clause is to sharpen that process by giving 14 days for a reaction to the responsible clinician's report. Any delay or trouble indicates an under-provision in NHS secure units, which should be addressed, and a strain on the prison service. The new clause would set a sensible service standard. Many cases now wait three months or more, and the waiting is becoming worse. I accept that there are technical problems, but leaving the default situation as it is at the moment means leaving people who are very ill, very dangerous and very disruptive in the prison system.

Tim Boswell: I shall be brief. I endorse the comments that have been made on this matter. I have three penal establishments all lined up in a row in my constituency. One is a secure training centre, and I recently discussed the matter with the rector there. The staff go to immense trouble to assess young people's mental health on admission, and it is frustrating, if their condition deteriorates and it is necessary to refer them away for treatment, if there is a long, difficult and worrying delay before than can happen.

Amendments made: No. 25, page 24, line 37, after 'that', insert 'and to subsection (5) below'.
	No. 26, page 25, line 5, leave out 'under section 37(4)' and insert
	'for his detention in a place of safety under section 37(4) or 45A(5)'.
	No. 27, page 25, line 11, after 'above.', insert—
	'(5) Section 58A and, so far as relevant to that section, sections 59 to 62 below also apply to any patient who—
	(a) does not fall within subsection (3) above;
	(b) is not a community patient; and
	(c) has not attained the age of 18 years.'.
	No. 28, page 25, line 31, leave out
	'(within the meaning of section 64C below)'
	and insert
	'for the purposes of section 64C or 64E below'.
	No. 29, page 25, line 35, at end insert—
	'( ) Section 58A above does not apply to treatment given to the patient if there is authority to give the treatment, and the certificate requirement is met, for the purposes of section 64C or 64E below.'.
	No. 30, page 25, line 47, after '58', insert 'or 58A'.— [Ms  Rosie  Winterton.]

Introduction
	1 Chapter 2 of Part 3 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (provision of information to victims of restricted patients under the 1983 Act, etc.) is amended as set out in this Schedule.
	 Hospital orders (with or without restriction orders)
	2 (1) Section 36 (victims' rights: preliminary) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (3), for "with a restriction order" substitute ", whether with or without a restriction order,".
	(3) In subsection (5)—
	(a) in paragraph (a), after "discharge from hospital" insert "while a restriction order is in force in respect of him", and
	(b) after paragraph (b) insert ";
	(c) what conditions he should be subject to in the event of his discharge from hospital under a community treatment order".
	3 After section 36 insert—
	"36A Supplemental provision for case where no restriction order made
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 36 applies, the hospital order in respect of the patient was made without a restriction order.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the local probation board mentioned in section 36(4) to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence, when his wishes are ascertained under section 36(4), expresses a wish—
	(a) to make representations about a matter specified in section 36(5), or
	(b) to receive the information specified in section 36(6).
	(3) The local probation board must—
	(a) notify the managers of the hospital in which the patient is detained of that person's wish and of that person's name and address, and
	(b) notify that person of the name and address of the hospital.
	(4) Subsection (5) applies if a person who appears to the local probation board mentioned in section 36(4) to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence, subsequently to his wishes being ascertained under section 36(4), expresses a wish to do something specified in subsection (2)(a) or (b).
	(5) The local probation board mentioned in section 36(4) must take all reasonable steps—
	(a) to ascertain whether the hospital order made in respect of the patient continues in force and whether a community treatment order is in force in respect of him, and
	(b) if the board ascertains that the hospital order does continue in force—
	(i) to notify the managers of the relevant hospital of that person's wish, and
	(ii) to notify that person of the name and address of the hospital.
	(6) The relevant hospital is—
	(a) the hospital in which the patient is detained, or
	(b) if a community treatment order is in force in respect of the patient, the responsible hospital."
	4 In section 37 (the title to which becomes "Representations where restriction order made"), in subsection (1), for "if section 36 applies" substitute "if, in a case where section 36 applies, the hospital order in respect of the patient was made with a restriction order".
	5 After section 37 insert—
	"37A Representations where restriction order not made
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 36 applies, the hospital order in respect of the patient was made without a restriction order.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if—
	(a) a person makes representations about a matter specified in section 36(5) to the managers of the relevant hospital, and
	(b) it appears to the managers that the person is the victim of the offence or acts for the victim of the offence.
	(3) The managers must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter.
	(4) The responsible clinician must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if he is considering making—
	(a) an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983,
	(b) a community treatment order in respect of the patient, or
	(c) an order under section 17B(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983 to vary the conditions specified in a community treatment order in force in respect of the patient.
	(5) Any person who has the power to make an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if he is considering making that order.
	(6) A Mental Health Review Tribunal must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if—
	(a) an application is made to the tribunal under section 66 or 69 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
	(b) the patient's case is referred to the tribunal under section 67 of that Act.
	(7) Subsection (8) applies if—
	(a) the managers of the relevant hospital receive information under subsection (4), (5) or (6), and
	(b) a person who appears to the managers to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—
	(i) when his wishes were ascertained under section 36(4), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 36(5), or
	(ii) has made representations about such a matter to the managers of the hospital in which the patient was, at the time in question, detained.
	(8) The managers of the relevant hospital must provide the information to the person.
	(9) The relevant hospital has the meaning given in section 36A(6)."
	6 In section 38 (the title to which becomes "Information where restriction order made"), in subsection (1) for "if section 36 applies" substitute "if, in a case where section 36 applies, the hospital order in respect of the patient was made with a restriction order".
	7 After section 38 insert —
	"38A Information where restriction order not made
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 36 applies, the hospital order in respect of the patient was made without a restriction order.
	(2) The responsible clinician must inform the managers of the relevant hospital—
	(a) whether he is to make an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983;
	(b) whether he is to make a community treatment order in respect of the patient;
	(c) if a community treatment order is to be made in respect of the patient, what conditions are to be specified in the order;
	(d) if a community treatment order is in force in respect of the patient, of any variation to be made under section 17B(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983 of the conditions specified in the order;
	(e) if a community treatment order in respect of the patient is to cease to be in force, of the date on which it is to cease to be in force;
	(f) if, following the examination of the patient under section 20 of the Mental Health Act 1983, it does not appear to the responsible clinician that the conditions set out in subsection (4) of that section are satisfied, of the date on which the authority for the patient's detention is to expire.
	(3) Any person who has the power to make an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if he is to make that order.
	(4) Subsection (5) applies if—
	(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 66 or 69 of the Mental Health Act 1983,
	(b) the patient's case is referred to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 67 of that Act, or
	(c) the managers of the relevant hospital refer the patient's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 68 of that Act.
	(5) The tribunal must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if it directs that the patient is to be discharged.
	(6) Subsection (7) applies if a person who appears to the managers of the relevant hospital to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 36(4), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 36(6), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the managers of the relevant hospital that he wishes to receive that information.
	(7) The managers of the relevant hospital order must take all reasonable steps—
	(a) to inform that person whether the patient is to be discharged under section 23 or 72 of the Mental Health Act 1983;
	(b) to inform that person whether a community treatment order is to be made in respect of the patient;
	(c) if a community treatment order is to be made in respect of the patient and is to specify conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family, to provide that person with details of those conditions;
	(d) if a community treatment order is in force in respect of the patient and the conditions specified in the order are to be varied under section 17B(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983, to provide that person with details of any variation which relates to contact with the victim or his family;
	(e) if a community treatment order in respect of the patient is to cease to be in force, to inform that person of the date on which it is to cease to be in force;
	(f) if, following the examination of the patient under section 20 of the Mental Health Act 1983, the authority for the patient's detention is not to be renewed, to inform that person of the date on which the authority is to expire;
	(g) to provide that person with such other information as the managers of the relevant hospital consider appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
	(8) The relevant hospital has the meaning given by section 36A(6).
	38B Removal of restriction
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 36 applies—
	(a) the hospital order in respect of the patient was made with a restriction order, and
	(b) the restriction order ceases to have effect while the hospital order continues in force.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 36(4), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 36(5) or to receive the information specified in section 36(6), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to make representations about such a matter or to receive that information.
	(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps—
	(a) to notify the managers of the relevant hospital of an address at which that person may be contacted;
	(b) to notify that person of the name and address of the hospital.
	(4) While the hospital order continues in force, the patient is to be regarded as a patient in respect of whom a hospital order was made without a restriction order; and sections 37A and 38A are to apply in relation to him accordingly.
	(5) The relevant hospital has the meaning given in section 36A(6).
	(6) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section 37(8)."
	 Hospital directions and limitation directions
	8 In section 39 (victims' rights: preliminary), in subsection (3)—
	(a) in paragraph (a), after "discharge from hospital" insert "while he is subject to a limitation direction", and
	(b) after that paragraph insert—
	"(aa) what conditions he should be subject to in the event of his discharge from hospital under a community treatment order;".
	9 After section 41 insert—
	"41A Removal of restriction
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 39 applies—
	(a) the limitation direction in respect of the offender ceases to be in force, and
	(b) he is treated for the purposes of the Mental Health Act 1983 as a patient in respect of whom a hospital order has effect.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 39(2), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 39(3) or to receive the information specified in section 39(4), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to make representations about such a matter or to receive that information.
	(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps—
	(a) to notify the managers of the relevant hospital of an address at which that person may be contacted;
	(b) to notify that person of the address of the hospital.
	(4) The offender is to be regarded as a patient in respect of whom a hospital order was made without a restriction order; and sections 37A and 38A are to apply in relation to him accordingly.
	(5) The relevant hospital has the meaning given in section 36A(6).
	(6) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section 40(8)."
	 Transfer directions (with or without restriction directions)
	10 (1) Section 42 (victims' rights: preliminary) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1)(c), for "and a restriction order in respect of him" substitute "in respect of the offender (whether or not he also gives a restriction direction in respect of the offender)".
	(3) In subsection (3)—
	(a) in paragraph (a), after "discharge from hospital" insert "at a time when a restriction direction is in force in respect of him", and
	(b) after paragraph (b) insert ";
	(c) what conditions he should be subject to in the event of his discharge from hospital under a community treatment order".
	11 After section 42 insert—
	"42A Supplemental provision for case where no restriction direction given
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 42 applies, the transfer direction in respect of the patient was given without a restriction direction.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the local probation board mentioned in section 42(2) to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence, when his wishes are ascertained under section 42(2), expresses a wish—
	(a) to make representations about a matter specified in section 42(3), or
	(b) to receive the information specified in section 42(4).
	(3) The local probation board must—
	(a) notify the managers of the hospital in which the patient is detained of that person's wish and of that person's name and address, and
	(b) notify that person of the name and address of the hospital.
	(4) Subsection (5) applies if a person who appears to the local probation board mentioned in section 42(2) to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence, subsequently to his wishes being ascertained under section 42(2), expressed a wish to do something specified in subsection (2)(a) or (b).
	(5) The local probation board mentioned in section 42(2) must take all reasonable steps—
	(a) to ascertain whether the transfer direction given in respect of the patient continues in force and whether a community treatment order is in force in respect of him, and
	(b) if the board ascertains that the transfer direction does continue in force—
	(i) to notify the managers of the relevant hospital of that person's wish, and
	(ii) to notify that person of the name and address of the hospital.
	(6) The relevant hospital has the meaning given in section 36A(6)."
	12 In section 43 (the title to which becomes "Representations where restriction direction made"), in subsection (1), for "if section 42 applies" substitute "if, in a case where section 42 applies, the transfer direction in respect of the patient was given with a restriction direction".
	13 After section 43 insert—
	"43A Representations where restriction direction not given
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 42 applies, the transfer direction in respect of the patient was given without a restriction direction.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if—
	(a) a person makes representations about a matter specified in section 42(3) to the managers of the relevant hospital, and
	(b) it appears to the managers that the person is the victim of the offence or acts for the victim of the offence.
	(3) The managers must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter.
	(4) The responsible clinician must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if he is considering making—
	(a) an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983,
	(b) a community treatment order in respect of him, or
	(c) an order under section 17B(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983 to vary the conditions specified in a community treatment order in force in respect of the patient.
	(5) Any person who has power to make an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if he is considering making that order.
	(6) A Mental Health Review Tribunal must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if—
	(a) an application is made to the tribunal under section 66 or 69 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
	(b) the patient's case is referred to the tribunal under section 67 of that Act.
	(7) Subsection (8) applies if—
	(a) the managers of the relevant hospital receive information under subsection (4), (5) or (6), and
	(b) a person who appears to the managers to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—
	(i) when his wishes were ascertained under section 42(2), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 42(3), or
	(ii) has made representations about such a matter to the managers of the hospital in which the patient was, at the time in question, detained.
	(8) The managers of the relevant hospital must provide the information to the person.
	(9) The relevant hospital has the meaning given in section 36A(6)."
	14 In section 44 (the title to which becomes "Information where restriction direction made"), in subsection (1), for "if section 42 applies" substitute "if, in a case where section 42 applies, the transfer direction in respect of the patient was given with a restriction direction".
	15 After section 44 insert —
	"44A Information where restriction direction not given
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 42 applies, the transfer direction in respect of the patient was given without a restriction direction.
	(2) The responsible clinician must inform the managers of the relevant hospital—
	(a) whether he is to make an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983;
	(b) whether he is to make a community treatment order in respect of the patient;
	(c) if a community treatment order is to be made in respect of the patient, what conditions are to be specified in the order;
	(d) if a community treatment order is in force in respect of the patient, of any variation to be made under section 17B(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983 of the conditions specified in the order;
	(e) if a community treatment order in respect of the patient is to cease to be in force, of the date on which it is to cease to be in force;
	(f) if, following the examination of the patient under section 20 of the Mental Health Act 1983, it doesnot appear to the responsible clinician that the conditions set out in subsection (4) of that section are satisfied, of the date on which the authority for the patient's detention is to expire.
	(3) Any person who has power to make an order for discharge in respect of the patient under section 23(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if he is to make that order.
	(4) Subsection (5) applies if—
	(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 66 or 69 of the Mental Health Act 1983,
	(b) the patient's case is referred to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 67 of that Act, or
	(c) the managers of the relevant hospital refer the patient's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 68 of that Act.
	(5) The tribunal must inform the managers of the relevant hospital if it directs that the patient be discharged.
	(6) Subsection (7) applies if a person who appears to the managers of the relevant hospital to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 42(2), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 42(4), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the managers of the relevant hospital that he wishes to receive that information.
	(7) The managers of the relevant hospital order must take all reasonable steps—
	(a) to inform that person whether the patient is to be discharged under section 23 or 72 of the Mental Health Act 1983;
	(b) to inform that person whether a community treatment order is to be made in respect of the patient;
	(c) if a community treatment order is to be made in respect of the patient and is to specify conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family, to provide that person with details of those conditions;
	(d) if a community treatment order is in force in respect of the patient and the conditions specified in the order are to be varied under section 17B(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983, to provide that person with details of any variation which relates to contact with the victim or his family;
	(e) if a community treatment order in respect of the patient is to cease to be in force, to inform that person of the date on which it is to cease to be in force;
	(f) if, following the examination of the patient under section 20 of the Mental Health Act 1983, the authority for the patient's detention is not to be renewed, to inform that person of the date on which the authority is to expire;
	(g) to provide that person with such other information as the managers of the relevant hospital consider appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
	(8) The relevant hospital has the meaning given by section 36A(6).
	44B Removal of restriction
	(1) This section applies if, in a case where section 42 applies—
	(a) the transfer direction in respect of the patient was given with a restriction direction, and
	(b) the restriction direction ceases to be in force while the transfer direction continues in force.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 42(2), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 42(3) or to receive the information specified in section 42(4), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to make representations about such a matter or to receive that information.
	(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps—
	(a) to notify the managers of the relevant hospital of an address at which that person may be contacted;
	(b) to notify that person of the name and address of the hospital.
	(4) While the transfer direction continues in force, the patient is to be regarded as a patient in respect of whom a transfer direction was given without a restriction direction; and sections 43A and 44A are to apply in relation to him accordingly.
	(5) The relevant hospital has the meaning given in section 36A(6).
	(6) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section 43(8)."
	 Interpretation
	16 (1) Section 45 (the title to which becomes "Interpretation: sections 35 to 44B") is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1)—
	(a) for "44" substitute "44B", and
	(b) at the appropriate places insert—
	""community treatment order" has the meaning given in section 17A of the Mental Health Act 1983;",
	""the managers" has the meaning given in section 145 of the Mental Health Act 1983;",
	""responsible clinician" means the responsible clinician for the purposes of Part 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983;", and
	""responsible hospital" has the meaning given in section 17A of the Mental Health Act 1983;".
	(3) In subsection (2), for "44" substitute "44B".
	(4) After subsection (2) insert—
	"(3) A reference in sections 35 to 44B to a place in which a person is detained includes a reference to a place in which he is liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.
	(4) For the purposes of section 32(3) of that Act (regulations as to delegation of managers' functions, etc.) as applied by Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1 to that Act, a function conferred on the managers of a hospital under sections 35 to 44B of this Act is to be treated as a function of theirs under Part 3 of that Act."'.— [Ms  Rosie  Winterton.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second Time, and added to the Bill.

Amendments made: No. 51, page 89, line 44, at end insert ', or
	(c) any section 39D IMCA.'.
	No. 52, page 92, line 9, at end insert—
	'(d) the right to have a section 39D IMCA appointed;
	(e) how to have a section 39D IMCA appointed.'.
	No. 53, page 92, line 18, at end insert—
	'(7) Sub-paragraph (8) applies if the managing authority is notified that a section 39D IMCA has been appointed.
	(8) As soon as is practicable after being notified, the managing authority must give the section 39D IMCA a copy of the written information given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4).'.
	No. 54, page 101, line 22, at end insert—
	'(ba) any section 39D IMCA;'.
	No. 55, page 108, line 22, at end insert—
	'(d) any section 39D IMCA.'.
	No. 56, page 111, line 26, at end insert—
	'(d) any section 39D IMCA.'.
	No. 57, page 116, line 9, at end insert—
	'156A A section 39D IMCA is an independent mental capacity advocate appointed under section 39D.'.
	No. 58, page 116, line 10, at end insert 'or a section 39D IMCA.'.— [Ms Rosie Winterton.]

Amendments made: No. 60, page 129, line 41, leave out from 'subsection (1)' to end and insert
	'after "relate" insert "or persons who fall within section 39A, 39C or 39D".'.
	No. 61, page 132, line 13, at end insert—
	'39D Person subject to Schedule A1 without paid representative
	(1) This section applies if—
	(a) an authorisation under Schedule A1 is in force in relation to a person ("P"),
	(b) P has a representative ("R") appointed under Part 10 of Schedule A1, and
	(c) R is not being paid under regulations under Part 10 of Schedule A1 for acting as P's representative.
	(2) The supervisory body must instruct an independent mental capacity advocate to represent P in any of the following cases.
	(3) The first case is where P makes a request to the supervisory body to instruct an advocate.
	(4) The second case is where R makes a request to the supervisory body to instruct an advocate.
	(5) The third case is where the supervisory body have reason to believe one or more of the following—
	(a) that, without the help of an advocate, P and R would be unable to exercise one or both of the relevant rights;
	(b) that P and R have each failed to exercise a relevant right when it would have been reasonable to exercise it;
	(c) that P and R are each unlikely to exercise a relevant right when it would be reasonable to exercise it.
	(6) The duty in subsection (2) is subject to section 39E.
	(7) If an advocate is appointed under this section, the advocate is, in particular, to take such steps as are practicable to help P and R to understand the following matters—
	(a) the effect of the authorisation;
	(b) the purpose of the authorisation;
	(c) the duration of the authorisation;
	(d) any conditions to which the authorisation is subject;
	(e) the reasons why each assessor who carried out an assessment in connection with the request for the authorisation, or in connection with a review of the authorisation, decided that P met the qualifying requirement in question;
	(f) the relevant rights;
	(g) how to exercise the relevant rights.
	(8) The advocate is, in particular, to take such steps as are practicable to help P or R—
	(a) to exercise the right to apply to court, if it appears to the advocate that P or R wishes to exercise that right, or
	(b) to exercise the right of review, if it appears to the advocate that P or R wishes to exercise that right.
	(9) If the advocate helps P or R to exercise the right of review—
	(a) the advocate may make submissions to the supervisory body on the question of whether a qualifying requirement is reviewable;
	(b) the advocate may give information, or make submissions, to any assessor carrying out a review assessment.
	(10) In this section—
	"relevant rights" means—
	(a) the right to apply to court, and (b) the right of review;
	"right to apply to court" means the right to make an application to the court to exercise its jurisdiction under section 21A;
	"right of review" means the right under Part 8 of Schedule A1 to request a review.
	39E Limitation on duty to instruct advocate under section 39D
	(1) This section applies if an advocate is already representing P in accordance with an instruction under section 39D.
	(2) Section 39D(2) does not require another advocate to be instructed, unless the following conditions are met.
	(3) The first condition is that the existing advocate was instructed—
	(a) because of a request by R, or
	(b) because the supervisory body had reason to believe one or more of the things in section 39D(5).
	(4) The second condition is that the other advocate would be instructed because of a request by P." '.
	No. 62, page 132, line 15, after '40', insert
	'(as substituted by section [Independent mental capacity advocacy service: exceptions] of this Act)'.
	No. 63, page 132, line 17, leave out from 'for' to end of line 18 and insert
	'"or 39(4) or (5)" substitute ", 39(4) or (5), 39A(3), 39C(3) or 39D(2)".'.
	No. 64, page 132, line 22, leave out from 'matters' to end of line 23 and insert
	'to which a duty mentioned in subsection (1) relates."'.
	No. 65, page 134, line 18, at end insert—
	
		
			 "Section 39D Instructing independent mental capacity advocate when representative for relevant person under Part 10 of Schedule A1 to the Act is not being paid."— [Ms Rosie Winterton.]

Rosie Winterton: New clause 4 and amendment No. 50 are the result of further consideration that we have given to age-appropriate services for children and young people following detailed debates in the other place and in Committee, and discussions that I have had since then with YoungMinds, 11 Million—the new name for the Office of the Children's Commissioner for England—and Lord Williamson of Horton, to whom I pay particular tribute. Lord Williamson tabled the initial amendment on the subject. He has also given us a lot of help in thinking through the Government amendments. There are those who say that his help has been so central to the debate that the new clause should be called the Williamson amendment.
	Let me remind hon. Members about the background. The Children's Commissioner for England's powerful report "Pushed into the Shadows" was extremely timely in highlighting the bad experiences that some young people have had on adult psychiatric wards. Professor Aynsley-Green and his staff have been most helpful and constructive in discussions on how to tackle the problem. The children's organisation YoungMinds researched that report for the children's commissioner. It has also been a vigorous campaigner on the issue. It has always been willing to engage in constructive discussion to resolve the problem in a way that is acceptable to all and will be effective. Hon. Members who served on the Committee will know that I had reservations about implementing some of the changes that were requested, but following discussions with the organisations, and with Kathryn Pugh from YoungMinds, who has been a powerful and persuasive advocate for children, in particular, and with the realistic attitude that is being adopted, I think that we have found a way forward.
	I am also aware that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, led by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), has been supportive on this issue. Indeed, he has tabled new clause 8. I hope that following my remarks he will be reassured that new clause 4 and amendment No. 50 make it possible for him not to press his new clause to a Division.
	New clause 4 will ensure that patients aged under 18 are detained in a hospital environment that is suitable for their age, subject to their needs. We have used the word "environment" because what matters to a childor young person goes well beyond mere physical segregation from older people, as I am sure right hon. and hon. Members appreciate. By using the word "environment" we can ensure not only that children and young people have separate facilities, but that they are appropriate physical facilities, with staff who have the right training to understand and address their specific needs as children, and a hospital routine that will allow their personal, social and educational development to continue as normally as possible. We do that by using the word "environment", and by giving hospital managers a duty to ensure that that is the case.

Tim Boswell: The Minister makes a case that we find congenial, as she will have noticed because we have put our names to the new clause. Will she confirm thatin cases when a person is referred to a hospital environment in another local authority area, which is not untypical in my constituency because of its geography, there will be adequate support that crosses the boundary so that their studies are supported and disruption is minimised?

Tim Loughton: I find myself for the second time this evening congratulating the Minister on having listened—at long last, and despite having thrown a bit of a strop in Committee on this subject—and on having returned with worthwhile amendments. Although they do not go explicitly as far as some of us asked, their spirit is very much in keeping with what we hoped for. I join her in paying tribute to the excellent work of Lord Williamson in another place, who to a great extent kicked off the consideration of this issue by introducing a measure under which three conditions were to be met: admission to age-appropriate settings, and medical assessments by a CAMHS specialist and by a clinical supervisor specialist. That provided a good starting point to lay out the importance of this subject; many Members of this House and of the other place, and many people in YoungMinds and other mental health organisations, feel strongly about it, as do many young people suffering from mental illness.
	I also join the Minister in paying tribute to YoungMinds and the sterling work of Kathryn Pugh, who follows our deliberations closely. I can say that without having to declare an interest—unlike the hon. Member for Southport (Dr. Pugh) if he wishes to reiterate that praise when he comes to speak.
	I also pay tribute to the report of "Sir 11 million" as we now must call the children's commissioner. "Pushed into the shadows: young people's experience of adult mental health facilities" reported some shocking testimonies of the experiences of young people who had found themselves in traumatic periods of their lives in wholly inappropriate and very depressing and traumatic environments. In a variety of witness evidence that Members of both Houses received, we heard some brave and devastating testimonies, particularly from teenage girls, about such experiences in adult acute mental health wards. They told us about having to use mixed-sex bathrooms and about being in wards with older men who had committed violent acts, and they also told us that no education facilities were provided for them. At important stages in their educational career they found themselves in a mental health institution with no way of getting back to some degree of normality by furthering their education. One of our witnesses said that eating was the only recreation. We also heard about problems to do with siblings aged under 18 not being able to visit.
	The testimony of one witness, Antonia, was especially stark, and it might be helpful if I repeat some of it. She said that in order to be in an adolescent service,
	"I would rather go to Scotland than be 10 minutes down the road from my home."
	That serves to emphasise how important it is to have age-appropriate treatment. Even if she had to go a long way to get it, that was preferable to being placed more conveniently closer to home in an inappropriate setting.
	I am pleased that the Government have taken on board the comments that have been made, and that the amendments cover all those aged under 18. There was a big argument about how we address 16 and 17-year-olds—it is completely inappropriate for many in that age group to be placed in adult wards, but for some of them it is more appropriate. In our amendments in Committee we were at pains to retain the flexibility that 16 or 17-year-olds could be admitted to adult wards if appropriate. However, that must be decided on the basis of its appropriateness to their therapeutic benefit and recovery. I welcome the fact that all under-18s and voluntary and detained patients will be covered and that reference is made to the fact that a suitably qualified practitioner should be consulted at the assessment prior to admission.
	The code of practice will need to explain what a suitable environment is—I believe that it will do so—and also provide an explanation of the different needs of a child. Another matter that must be addressed is the placing of a duty on commissioners to inform local authorities where beds have been commissioned. Primary care trusts and health boards will have to tell local authorities where CAMHS beds have been commissioned for the local area.
	I think that we are happy to take the timing of the enactment of this provision on trust, just as we took the Minister at her word in Committee when she promised to look at this issue and come back with something more definitive, which she has now done. I realise that some perverse incentives are potentially built in, in that areas that are more advanced in their provision of CAMHS facilities might take their foot off the gas if they are told that everything has to come in by a certain date; we need to prompt the less advanced areas to make sure that they provide those facilities. I know that there is a particular problem in Wales, for example, and the hon. Member for Caernarfon (Hywel Williams) might wish to refer to it in a little while.
	All of us will feel let down and disappointed if we find ourselves coming back to this place in three years time to consider this issue and not a lot has changed. We need some strong assurances from the Minister that it will be a real priority for her Department, andwe perhaps need some explanation of a strong performance-management framework to complement the legislation, so that we can judge whether progress is being made and how fast, and judge what extra support or attention might need to be given in the meantime. There is a possibility, as YoungMinds pointed out, that some adult hospitals might interpret the provision in such a way that it will lead them to refuse all under-18-year-old patients. The Friday night scenario of clinicians phoning unit after unit to find one that will accept an under-18-year-old would then get worse, particularly if PCTs or health boards did not have to ensure adequate provision.
	We need a performance management framework or targets, although we are not great fans of the latter, to make sure that local partners understand their duty to commission sufficient capacity to ensure that age-appropriate facilities are available, and that local providers act in a manner that reflects the duty to co-operate to meet the needs of the child or young person, as enshrined in the Children Act 2004. This has got to be a joint effort and as the Minister rightly said, that is not going to happen if the services are not in place. This legislation should not be a substitute for services; rather, it should be a serious spur to the providers to make sure that services are available and appropriate and are being used properly, and that as many of our children and young people as possible are being picked up and given the appropriate treatment that they need and deserve.
	We will track closely the progress of this measure, as the Minister has mentioned. I shall be interested to hear what the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) has to say about his new clause 8, with which I have a deal of sympathy because it places greater duties specifically on commissioners and PCTs, and not just on hospital managers. As I said, this is a team effort in which a joined-up approach involving everyone will be absolutely essential.
	I have to say that the Government have moved a long way. They have listened to a very compelling argument that was started in Parliament in the Lords, but which was first started by charities such as YoungMinds and by brave young people themselves coming forward and saying that the current arrangements are just not good enough. As the Mental Health Act Commission found in its report, a young person a day was being inappropriately admitted to adult acute wards, and the therapeutic benefit of those establishments in terms of the appropriateness of treating such young people was being seriously called into question. We are delighted that the Government have tabled these new clauses and we will certainly support them, but that support will not be given without a deal of assurances about how they are going to work in practice, and an assurance that the Minister is going to keep on the case of those responsible for ensuring that the measures become a reality.

Sandra Gidley: The Minister was clear, in as much as she is not going to accept my amendment No. 83 and asked me to withdraw it. However, I thought it worth clarifying why I tabled it. It is an attempt to make it clear that children under 16 who are competent to make decisions can either consent to or refuse to agree to their admission to hospital for treatment of mental disorder. If such a child does not agree to being admitted to hospital, this refusal cannot be overridden by a person with parental responsibility. The amendment achieves this by extending the remit of section 131 of the 1983 Act, which relates to informal admission, to cover children under 16 who are considered competent to make such decisions.
	If the amendment is accepted, a person with parental responsibility would not be able to agree to the child's being informally admitted to hospital if the child is deemed competent to make this decision and is refusing to be admitted. Where a competent child refuses to agree to admission to hospital for treatment for mental disorder, the mental health professionals involved would need to consider whether the criteria for admission to hospital under the 1983 Act are met, and in a small number of cases the powers under the Children Act 1989 may be appropriate.
	As the Minister said, clause 40 of the Bill will amend section 131 of the 1983 Act. This was a Government amendment introduced in the other place, and it makes it clear that a 16 or 17-year-old who is capable of making such decisions may decide whether or not to be admitted to hospital for treatment for mental disorder, and that that decision cannot be overridden by a person with parental responsibility. That amendment was welcome and clarifies the position of 16 and 17-year-olds, but it is also important to clarify the position of Gillick-competent children. A child is generally considered Gillick-competent if they have sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fully what is being proposed, and to be capable of making up their own mind on the matter.
	The Minister said that this issue is complex, and I agree; indeed, that is partly the motivation behind tabling this amendment. There is great uncertainty in the law, and this is an attempt to clarify it. There is a certain amount of confusion among practitioners responsible for the care and treatment of children and young people with mental health problems. It has commonly been accepted that the refusal of a Gillick-competent child or young person to accept medical treatment can be overridden by a person with parental responsibility for them. There is case law to that effect. In the area of mental health, that has led to great uncertainty among professionals. If the young people have complex mental health care needs, the professionals have to rely on parental consent in the face of disagreement from the young person. In some cases, that uncertainty has caused delay in making the appropriate arrangements for the treatment and care of the young child or person. I am sure that we would all wish to avoid that happening.
	If a parental decision overrules a child under 16, it can cause longstanding tensions between the child and parent. It is usually a stressful time for them and it seems unfair to place the weight of responsibility for that decision on the parent. There is also the question of respecting the rights of the child. If he or she is competent to make the decision, for example, to refuse admission to hospital, relying on parental consent to authorise the admission could breach the child's right to liberty under article 5 of the European convention on human rights. That is acknowledged in the draft code of practice. Richard Jones, an expert in mental health law, states:
	"It is likely that the Court would hold that a parental consent to the admission of a mentally competent child to a psychiatric hospital violates Art. 5 if the child objects to the admission."
	The Government's approach appears inconsistent, because the Bill's provisions on community treatment orders cover child community patients under 16 years of age, but do not address the problem I have described. The Department has previously indicated that case law has developed to give greater autonomy to children and young people and it is no longer the case that a person with parental responsibility can override the refusal of a child or young person, of whatever age, who has the capacity to make such decisions for him or herself. The indication was therefore that it was not necessary to include this issue because the case law is clear. For example, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath has said that
	"more recent cases demonstrate the trend towards greater autonomy for young people."—[ Official Report, House of Lords, 15 January 2007; Vol. 688, c. 545.]
	The Government's reasons for taking that approach are outlined in Lord Hunt's letter to Baroness Walmsley of 16 January 2007. But the case cited by Lord Hunt—R  v. Secretary of State for Health (Axon)—relatesto consent to advice and treatment and the dutyof confidentiality. It considered how medical professionals should deal with young people who are Gillick-competent and want advice on sexual matters, but who cannot be persuaded to inform their parents or to permit the medical professionals to do so. It does not address the issue of a competent child's refusal of medical treatment.
	The Minister mentioned guidance, and the most important point is that the draft illustrative code of practice to the Mental Health Act 1983, which has been published to help people to understand the Bill, removes references to the refusal of a Gillick-competent child or capable 16 or 17-year-old being overridden by a person with parental responsibility. However, it cites no case law to support that view nor does it provide any explanation for the change in approach. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify when the guidance will be produced and what form it will take, because another publication, "The Reference Guide to Consent for Examination and Treatment", issued by the Department in 2001, claims that it
	"sets out in detail the current English law on consent".
	That document refers to parental consent overriding the refusal of a competent child or young person. Although it suggests that that power should be used rarely, it also highlights the lack of clarity on the issue by acknowledging that
	"no definitive guidance has been given as to when it is appropriate to over-rule a competent young person's refusal".
	The issue is very confused and medical practitioners receive conflicting advice in different publications by the Department. The amendment was an attempt to avoid further confusion and provide an explicit statutory provision that those with parental responsibility cannot override the competent refusal of a child—

Rosie Winterton: Obviously, there will still be a Labour Government.
	I thank the Committee chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) for its interest in the Bill and its probing and detailed approach. I thank him for his comments about the way in which I have engaged with the Committee and for saying that he will not press new clause 8 to a Division, in recognition of the fact that the Government's position has moved.
	The hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) was ably assisted by the hon. Member for Southport(Dr. Pugh)—I am sure that his relatives will note the interest that he declared. I have tried to explain why amendment No. 83, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Romsey, is unacceptable.
	The hon. Lady called for greater clarity. As I said, we will examine the code. We will also continue to discuss with YoungMinds and the children's commissioner the way in which we develop consolidated CAMHS guidance for practitioners, which is her particular concern, so that we can bring together a lot of necessary information and existing guidance. I assure her that we will keep her informed, perhaps through the organisations on behalf of which she spoke. If she knows of other organisations with concerns outwith those that I have named, she might like to let me have that information so that I can ensure that officials liaise with them on the guidance.
	The hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr. Walker) raised the question of cost and talked about the importance of services near to home. In my opening remarks, I pointed out how we are examining the commissioning of services with the Care Services Improvement Partnership. If we can get proper commissioning and the performance management about which we have talked—perhaps we could ask the Healthcare Commission to examine this matter—we can ensure that services are as near to home as feasible and that people are aware of where beds are available.
	We will give funding estimates, and we will ensure that the health service has the necessary funds available. Our estimates suggest that there will be overall capital costs of £10 million as well as ongoing revenue costs. We will work closely with the health service. As hon. Members will know, we have already made announcements about this matter.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs. Moon) was right that 16 and 17-year-olds—those affected by amendment No. 4, which she tabled—are at an extremely vulnerable time of their lives. I was struck by the fact that she said that YoungMinds and the children's commissioner were especially supportive of the amendment. I get the feeling that it is supported by hon. Members on both sides of the House, and we will certainly accept it. I congratulate her on introducing it.

Andrew Dismore: My right hon. Friend the Minister of State has yet to convince us on the point with which our amendments deal, and a meeting of minds may not occur. However, I hope that she will be able to make further progress on convincing us when she responds to the amendments.
	Amendments Nos. 70 and 73 in this group, and amendment No. 79 in the next, are designed to give effect to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its fourth report at paragraph 26, and its 15th report at paragraphs 1.7 to 1.14. Our amendments would ensure that registered medical practitioners provide objective medical evidence of a mental disorder to justify detention and to cases before mental health tribunals. Our concern is that case law from the European Court of Human Rights—in particular, Winterwerp  v. Netherlands and Varbanov  v. Bulgaria—requires that objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder justifying detention should come from a medically qualified expert who has recognised skills in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. The Bill's current provisions do not require that.
	A surprisingly broad range of professional groups will be eligible to provide objective medical evidence of mental disorder, including occupational therapists and social workers. All must demonstrate an extensive list of competencies, but some of the competencies are very broad indeed. In our 15th report at paragraph 1.13, we make the point that it is not specified how people will demonstrate that they have those competencies. We state:
	"The regulations say that the relevant authorities must have regard to references, but there seems to be no requirement for an examination."
	The Committee points out that the approval process under section 12 of the 1983 Act that applies to doctors does not, in our view, work in relation to the competencies, because many of the skills in question are medical skills, and occupational therapists and social workers do not already have the same baseline qualifications as doctors have.
	Our report continues:
	"Second, the competencies relating to assessment require first an ability to identify the presence or absence of mental disorder and its severity... One competency refers to the ability to undertake a 'broad mental health assessment and formulations (sic) incorporating biological, psychological, cultural and social perspectives.' Frequent use is made of the term 'broad'. The competencies require a 'broad understanding' of different mental health treatment approaches. It is questionable whether 'broad competencies'"
	are sufficiently rigorous to
	"meet the intention behind the Convention safeguard of objective medical expertise."
	Our concern is that
	"The European Court of Human Rights might well uphold a challenge based on  Winterwerp and  Varbanov in a specific case where, for example, detention was renewed on the basis of a report from an occupational therapist without evidence from a doctor that the patient continued to suffer from mental disorder of a nature or degree warranting confinement."
	In her helpful letter in response to that report and the question how competencies might be demonstrated, my right hon. Friend the Minister of State said that
	"we will be working with stakeholders to determine the kinds of experience and training that would enable a professional to demonstrate the competencies."
	In other words, the detail is yet to be worked out. I believe that she accepts that the competencies are rather broad. It is interesting to see how the problem is described in a briefing produced on behalf of a range of organisations, including Unison, the Royal College of Nursing, occupational therapists and the British Psychological Society. Those organisations say that
	"the responsible clinician role should be competency based"
	but point out that
	"Responsible clinicians will be extremely experienced members of staff"
	who
	"will have met strict criteria"
	and who
	"would have to pass several...thresholds"
	and so on. In other words, in anticipation of the details being worked out, they make favourable assumptions, which I am sure my right hon. Friend will confirm. However, the detail is simply not there yet.
	The reason that is important is set out in the briefing from Mind, which points out that we are talking about a person potentially losing their liberty
	"for up to 12 months on the say of a single professional."
	Mind emphasises that
	"Renewing detention is no less important or difficult than the original decision to detain."
	and says that
	"At the very least there should be two suitably qualified professionals from different disciplines agreeing the detention."

Andrew Dismore: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, whose professional background has enabled him to play an important role in our consideration of the Bill.
	The point made by Mind is repeated by the Mental Health Alliance, representing patients in this context. It states:
	"The position under the 1983 Act, whereby a single doctor decides whether or not to renew a patient's detention for up to twelve months is unacceptable."
	The Alliance believes reform is needed that would satisfy the following principles—at least two professional opinions should agree the detention, with those opinions coming from different disciplines, and at least one of them providing the 'objective medical expertise' required by human rights legislation."
	When looking at renewal of detention, the British Medical Association also says that renewal should require opinions from
	"two professionals, from different professional backgrounds, one of whom must be able to provide 'objective medical expertise'...as required under the European case-law".
	In other words, the BMA makes the same point as the Joint Committee. The Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Royal Society reach similar conclusions in a briefing that they prepared on the Bill.
	The Joint Committee is worried that, if the proposals in the Bill are passed as they stand—simply based on broad competencies, without any of the detail fleshed out—the UK is at risk of falling foul of the European Court of Human Rights in cases where detention under the Mental Health Act has not been authorised by a properly qualified medical practitioner. That is a real risk. I know that there are other legal views, but the Joint Committee has a good track record in offering opinions on such matters. I suspect that our opinion is more likely to be correct than legal opinions produced by those who are perhaps not quite as objective and independent as the Committee, to justify a particular cause or pressure group's views.
	I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State will provide more detail of what is going on in relation to competencies. If she does, we might yet achieve the meeting of minds that has eluded us thus far.

Rosie Winterton: I certainly accept that some psychiatrists are worried about other people taking on the responsibilities that we have defined. I also accept that the hon. Gentleman has moved some way from his previous position, but his amendment No. 93 makes it very likely that a person who does not even know the patient could override the decision of the patient's responsible clinician. The vast majority of approved clinicians will be psychiatrists, at least initially. Under his amendment, it would probably be necessary to go outside the team, or even the hospital, to find an approved clinician who belonged to a different profession from the responsible clinician. That may not be the intention of his amendment, but it is certainly a result of it.
	Amendment No. 73, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, is unnecessary because the tribunal is an independent judicial body that can seek evidence from whomever it chooses. AmendmentsNos. 70 and 73 assume that only a doctor or a clinical psychologist can provide objective medical expertise, but I assure my hon. Friend that the statutory competence requirements will ensure that all responsible clinicians can provide objective medical expertise. Again, amendment No. 70 would allow a doctor or clinical psychologist who might not even know the patient to override the decision of the responsible clinician. We do not think that that is a desirable approach. It could lead to inappropriate discharge, which I am sure is not what my hon. Friend would want, and that would put the patient, their family or even the general public at risk.
	I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment, and I hope that the Opposition will withdraw theirs, but I also hope that my hon. Friend and the Opposition will continue to work with us, and that we will be able to convince them on the subject of competences, which will ensure very high standards, in terms of the responsibilities that we want to give to the responsible clinician.

'(1) The 1983 Act is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 58(3), after first "patient", insert "who is liable to be detained under this Act".
	(3) After section 58 of the 1983 Act, insert—
	"58A Consent to treatment of community patients
	(1) Subject to section 62A below, a community patient who has not been recalled to hospital shall not be given any form of treatment to which this section applies unless—
	(a) he has consented to that treatment and either the approved clinician in charge of that treatment or a registered medical practitioner appointed for the purposes of this Part of this Act has certified in writing that the patient is capable of understanding its nature, purpose and likely effect and has consented to it; or
	(b) a registered medical practitioner appointed as aforesaid (not being the approved clinician in charge of the treatment in question) has certified in writing that—
	(i) the patient is not capable of understanding the nature, purpose or likely effects of that treatment; and
	(ii) he has either no reason to believe that the patient objects to being given the treatment, or he does have reason to believe that patient so objects, but it is not necessary to use force against the patient in order to give the treatment; and
	(iii) he is satisfied that the treatment does not conflict with a valid and applicable advance decision, or a decision made by a donee or deputy or the Court of Protection; and
	(iv) it is appropriate for the treatment to be given.
	(2) Where a patient who has been liable to detention under this Act has been administered medication for mental disorder to which this section applies for less than three months prior to becoming a community patient, the period mentioned in section 58(1)(b) above shall be read to extend for no longer than one month beginning with the day on which the community treatment order is made.
	(3) The Secretary of State may by order vary the length of the period mentioned in subsection (2).
	(4) Certification under subsection (1)(b) above may take place whilst a patient remains liable to be detained, but will not come into force until the responsible clinician discharges the patient from detention in hospital under the terms of section 17A(1) above.
	(5) Before giving a certificate under section 58(3A)(b) above the registered medical practitioner shall consult two other persons, who have been professionally concerned with the patient's treatment, but of those persons—
	(a) at least one shall be a person who is not a registered medical practitioner; and
	(b) neither shall be the patient's responsible clinician or the approved clinician in charge of the treatment in question.
	(6) In section 61(1), leave out "or "58(3)(b)" " and insert "58(3)(b), or 58A(1)(b)".
	(7) In section 61(1)(a) after "20(3)", insert "20A(4)".
	(8) In section 61(3) for "responsible medical officer" substitute "approved clinician in charge of the treatment in questions".
	(9) In section 61(3), leave out "or "58(3)(b)" " and insert "58(3)(b), or 58A(1)(b)" ".
	(4) After section 62(2) insert—
	"(2A) Section 62A below shall not preclude the continuation of any treatment or of treatment under any plan pending compliance with section 58 above where a community patient is recalled to hospital or a community treatment order is revoked and
	(a) the patient is capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effect of that treatment and has consented to it; or
	(b) the patient is not capable of understanding its nature, purpose and likely effect of that treatment, but it is not necessary to restrain the patient in order to give the treatment.".
	(5) After section 62 (Urgent Treatment) insert—
	"62A Treatment on recall of community patient or revocation or order
	(1) This section applies where—
	(a) a community patient is recalled to hospital under section 17E above; or
	(b) a patient is liable to be detained under this Act following the revocation of a community treatment order under section 17F above in respect of him.
	(2) Subject to section 62 above, a patient to whom this section applies shall not be given any form of treatment to which section 58 applies without its certification under section 58(3)(e) following that recall or revocation.".
	(6) In section 64 (supplementary provisions for Part IV), after subsection (2) insert—
	"(3) In this Part of this Act, references to 'not capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects of treatment' are to be read in accordance with the test established at section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (c. 9).
	(4) References to a donee are to a donee of a lasting power of attorney (within the meaning a section 9 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) created by a the patient, where the donee is acting within the scope of his authority and in accordance with that Act.
	(5) References to a deputy are to a deputy appointed forthe patient by the Court of Protection under section 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, where the deputy is acting within the scope of this authority and in accordance with that Act.
	(6) Reference to the responsible clinician shall be construed as a reference to the responsible clinician within the meaning of Part 2 of this Act.
	(7) For the purpose of this section, a person restrains the patient if he—
	(a) uses, or threatens to use, force to require the doing of an act which the patient resists, or
	(b) restricts the patients liberty of movement, whether or not the patient resists.
	(8) References to a hospital include a registered establishment.".
	(7) In section 119 (practitioners approved for Part 4 and section 118)—
	(a) in subsection (2)(a) for "in a registered establishment" substitute "hospital or registered establishment or any community patient in a hospital or establishment of any description or (if access is granted) other place",
	(b) in subsection (2)(b), leave out "in that home" and insert "there",
	(c) after subsection (2) insert—
	"(3) In this section 'establishment of any description' shall be construed in accordance with section 4(8) of the Care Standards Act 2000.".'.— [Angela Browning.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Angela Browning: I should particularly like to speak to new clause 13, but I shall also discuss new clause 14 and amendments Nos. 96, 92 and 98, which basically address the question of consent to treatment, particularly on the part of community patients. New clause 13 would provide simpler but safer provision for community patients who are not recalled to hospital, particularly when it comes to providing for a second opinion authorising doctor to examine a community patient in the same set of circumstances as a patient who is detained. In other words, we would like parity, because there are clear parallels between the two sets of patients. New clause 14 seeks a second opinion in respect of those who may be covered by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but who none the less require treatment. The effect of the amendments is to require a SOAD to examine a community patient. The question is one of considering what happens to patients who are detained in a hospital, and of trying to implement legislation that will give parity to those outside hospital—and, in the context of this group of amendments, to those who are on community treatment orders.
	At the moment, under section 58 of the Mental Health Act 1983, a detained in-patient who has already been on medication for three months—we have had some discussion about whether the period should be three months—faces one of two situations. If the patient has capacity to consent to the medication, and does consent, as confirmed by the responsible clinician, the responsible clinician specifies the medication on statutory form 2. If patients lack capacity to consent to medication or if they retain capacity but refuse it while they are in-patients, the responsible clinician must require a SOAD. The SOAD reads the patient's medical records, examines them, interviews a nurse and another professional who is neither a doctor nor nurse but is involved with the patient's care, discusses the case with the responsible clinician, then authorises what medication may be given, including details about whether or not it may be given by injection or only by mouth, assuming that an injectable form of medication is made. Details are given on the statutory certificate issued by the SOAD, so there is careful clinical assessment by someone with a specific medical background.
	The SOAD assesses the patient's mental state, decides if they retain capacity, listens to their objections, if any, to any of the medication, takes note of the patient's past history and response to medication, including adverse effects, notes the patient's physical health—something that we have discussed a great deal in our debates on the legislation—and explores, particularly with the other professionals, whether there are other non-medication interventions that are more appropriate or whether there is a reasonable alternative. All patients on a community treatment order, after the relevant time of three or four months, see a SOAD, who undertakes the same assessments, examinations and interviews as those for in-patients, but because the patient agrees to the treatment, it is self-evident that the SOAD cannot explore the reason why the patient is refusing and whether that is reasonable. The SOAD will issue a certificate authorising both the medication that can be given only with the patient's capacitous consent and medication that can be given should the patient lose capacity or refuse the original medication in future. We raised that problem in Committee. The Minister rejected our proposal, but there was quite of a lot of discussion of the need to write the certificate and what might follow under a certain set of circumstances several weeks or even months down the track.
	The SOAD must issue the certificate, despite having no knowledge, nor being able to assess why, for example, the patient has suddenly become incapacitous or, while retaining capacity, has decided to refuse medication that they previously accepted. One must assume that patients on a community treatment order, as opposed to those who remain, or are detained as, in-patients, at the point at which the CTO is discussed, will agree to the treatment and suggested programme of intervention, which would be conditional on their having a CTO. All too often, however, things go wrong, so when something significant changes it is important to have a professional judgment by a clinician that is based on the facts, and that is what is at the heart of our proposals.
	The new clause gives CTO patients exactly the same rights and safeguards as patients detained in hospital. Patients who are capacitous and consenting would have their treatment authorised by the responsible clinician. Patients who lack capacity, or who refuse treatment, would have the safeguard of the requirement for a SOAD authorisation based on an examination and assessments at the time the decision needed to be made, not based on a piece of certification ordered previously, which could be many months out of date. Safeguards for necessary and emergency treatments are included by amending section 62 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to ensure that patients do not suffer as a result of having to wait for a SOAD assessment. The Minister should consider that seriously. In Committee, we did not have enough time to go into the disparity between the appropriate treatment for in-patients compared with the treatment for people on a CTO. The CTO is proposed as an alternative for patients who hitherto would have been considered for in-patient treatment, so it is right that there should be parity in the way in which their conditions are clinically addressed, particularly after a significant change of circumstances or after a given period after the CTO is made, and there is a need for reassessment by a clinician. I therefore hope that the Minister will look favourably at the proposal, as she often does when such cases are put to her, perhaps with a little more detail and time than we had in Committee. She has generously tabled amendments on Report—not, I accept, across the board, and I would have preferred many more to be tabled—on issues where she believes that fairness and parity should prevail for patients, as they should be treated equitably. That is what is at the heart of our proposals in this group of amendments.

Andrew Dismore: I have tabled amendment No. 74, and amendments Nos. 75 to 78, which relate to child patients in the community. I have also tabled amendment No. 79, which deals with appeal rights. The amendments seek to give effect to paragraphs 1.18 to 1.25 in the recommendations of the 15th report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Clause 32 governs the treatment of CTO patients in the community, without recalling the person to hospital. The basic principle is that a patient with capacity, or competence in the case of a child under 16, may be given treatment in the form of medicine for mental disorder only if they consent and if there is a certificate authorising the treatment from a SOAD. If the patient is capable but refuses treatment, that treatment may only be given without consent by recalling the person to hospital.
	The JCHR received evidence from the Children's Commissioner for England and from the Royal College of Psychiatrists expressing concern about the provisions of clause 32 and their potential impact on child community patients. The principal broad criticisms were that the provisions provide insufficient safeguards in relation to treatment without consent, that they are complex, cumbersome and confusing, and that there is insufficient guidance in the draft code on how they are intended to work. More specifically, a child patient may be given medicine for mental disorder without consent in the community if they lack "competence". The same applies to an adult patient if they lack "capacity". The Bill specifically provides that decisions about capacity are to be made in accordance with the test in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but there is no guidance as to how the competence of a child community patient is to be determined.
	Adult patients have greater protection in relation to non-emergency treatment than children, as the treatment of an adult must not conflict with an advance decision which the person giving the treatment is satisfied is valid and applicable. Equally, for adults, but not for children, the treatment may not be given if it conflicts with a decision of a donee, of a deputy, or of the Court of Protection. The Children's Commissioner and the Royal College of Psychiatrists argue that that should be addressed by giving those with parental responsibility the right to be consulted over the treatment of a child who lacks competence. The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Glass  v. the United Kingdom, recognised the rights of the mother of an incapacitated child patient as his treatment proxy when he lacked competence. The JCHR therefore recommends that provision should be made for the involvement of those with parental rights in decision making about the community treatment of child patients who lack competence. It recommends that individuals with parental rights should have the same rights as donees with lasting powers of attorney or deputies to refuse non-emergency treatment on behalf of an incompetent child patient.
	The Children's Commissioner and the Royal College of Psychiatrists have expressed deep concern, too, about the power forcibly to treat children and young people in the community when they actively resist treatment. They insist that guidance on the circumstances in which emergency treatment and the use of force are authorised should be clarified, and they say that further guidance is essential. We share those concerns. Treatment given without consent engages article 8 of the European convention on human rights, especially if there is an objection, and in order for such interferences to be in accordance with law, a person's position should be more clearly ascertainable than is currently the case, given the lack of specific guidance on competence.
	Again, my right hon. Friend the Minister helpfully wrote to the Committee about the matter, but I am a little concerned about her approach. The position that the Government seem to be adopting, as set out in paragraph 26 of her letter, is that the effect of allowing a parent to refuse treatment would be to veto community treatment for that child, which may not be in the child's best interests, but she goes on to say that without the co-operation of the parent, supervised community treatment will not work. The Government seem to want to have their cake and eat it, saying that the parent should not have rights in these circumstances, yet expecting them to co-operate.
	Without parental co-operation, it is unlikely that a treatment order in the community would be made in the first place. There is some inconsistency in the Government's position on the matter. When she replies to the debate, perhaps my right hon. Friend will give us more information about why she thinks parents should not be involved in the decision making about community treatment for their children.
	Amendment No. 79 relates to paragraphs 52 to 56 of our fourth report. A patient subject to a community treatment order can appeal to a mental health review tribunal against the order as a whole, but not against specific conditions of the order. We think that that risks interference with articles 5, 8 and 13 of the European convention. The Government's response was that the need to obtain the agreement of an authorised medical health professional as to the making of the CTO and as to the nature of the conditions to be imposed provides protection against arbitrariness. We do not think that that offers much of a safeguard. Will my right hon. Friend be more specific?
	The Mental Health Alliance supports the amendment because of the need for better safeguards against unreasonable conditions. It states that despite the Government's amendment, CTOs give clinicians wide powers to impose conditions on patients' behaviour and lifestyle—for example, that the patient should live in a certain institution, should be subject to curfew and should not engage in specified conduct.
	The MHA says, and I agree, that it is important that any conditions are reasonable and that the patient has the power to challenge any requirements that are unreasonable. It makes the valid point that the responsible clinician and the approved mental health professional may not have met the patient before their crisis, and may not have in-depth knowledge about the patient's home life or the needs of their carers. That could lead to assumptions about the patient and unreasonable expectations of their carers as to supervision of the patient, transportation for treatment, police conditions and even housing for the patient.
	The Mental Health Alliance gives a series of examples of conditions that could be unreasonable. A person could be required to live in a certain place where they might experience abuse or stigmatisation from neighbours. A person under a curfew might find that too restrictive if they find a job requiring them to work after specified curfew time. Although the supervising clinician may be sympathetic, the right to challenge such restrictions would hinge upon the good will of the clinician. That goes to the heart of the European convention. I hope my right hon. Friend will read our report on the matter in detail. It is not good enough to be able to challenge the order as a whole. It should be possible to challenge the conditions if they are specifically unreasonable. I urge her to consider the human rights implications of not providing such a right of appeal.

Charles Walker: My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. We are perhaps in danger of commanding mental health armies that do not exist—or do not yet exist. We need to be aware that huge resource issues are involved—we are talking about 25,000 people in England, which is about 500 for each county, and many will require additional support to what is already being provided by the existing excellent mental health service professionals. We thus need to explore the mechanism for delivery at greater length. Perhaps the noble Lords in the other place will do so when the Bill returns to them.
	The hon. Member for Finsbury Park— [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Finsbury, North— [Interruption.] I mean the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), I am sorry. I wanted to leave Finsbury Park in, because it is one of my local train stations on the way through to the House. I apologise as no slight was intended. The hon. Gentleman made an important point about the concerns of black and ethnic minorities. I have a briefing from the Commission for Racial Equality, which is concerned that certain communities will be more prone than others to CTOs. Of course, we hope that that will not be the case, but we need to have procedures in place to ensure that the concerns of minority groups—and indeed the concerns of hon. Members—are properly reflected in the implementation of CTOs. We do not want to disfranchise huge parts of our community so that people feel that the Bill is yet another measure unfairly applied against them. That is not where we want to be.
	I return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Angela Browning). Who will actually deliver CTOs? Will it be community mental health nurses, or will there be CTO teams working together to ensure that the orders are applied and work fairly in the community? CTOs will have significant training implications; the orders will be new to this country so we shall want to be sure that they are subject to best practice and effectively delivered. Who will be responsible for providing training? How much will it cost and how will it be given? Will it be on the job or will front-line practitioners have to be taken away from their patients to spend time learning about the new techniques? I hope that the Minister doesnot think I am being churlish when I raise these concerns — [ Interruption. ] I am sure she does not; she is too generous.

Charles Walker: The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point. I recall that many years ago when I was a young man there was all-round support for the idea of care in the community, returning people to the community, and closing institutions down. It sounded extremely good, and in theory was extremely good, but when people got back into the community insufficient care was delivered. Perhaps—I am not an expert on this—we would not need to go down the road of CTOs if we had the proper resources in place to ensure that people with mental illness receive the care and the contact that they need.
	It would be interesting to consider how we will measure CTOs' effectiveness. Again, I do not have the answer, but I am sure that the Minister has, and I am sure that she will tell us that she looks forward to coming to the House in three or four years—I look forward to my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham coming to the House—to tell us how they are working. I hope that they will have achieved what people want them to achieve, and that we will have better delivery of services to the mentally ill in our community.
	It has been pointed out that many of the people concerned are known to the mental health services, and that is so, but community treatment orders will often be compulsory, and that will require advocacy, which will have another implication on resources. We talked earlier about advocacy services, but if we are applying community treatment orders liberally around the country to people who do not want to be subject to them, I imagine that the demand for advocacy will be high. We must consider how we will meet that demand and who will meet it.
	We have talked about using local charities, such as Powher, which operates in my constituency—I am not sure whether hon. Members are familiar with it—but empowering such charities to help people who are worried about being placed under a CTO might be a way forward.
	Finally—I am sure that that will be a great relief to all hon. Members assembled here—how will we protect the confidentiality of patients under community treatment orders? Many of them will have jobs and places of work, and a CTO might stigmatise them. I would be interested to know whether, if someone is placed under such an order, there would be a personal contract between them and the relevant health service, or would the CTO be made known to a wider audience?
	To conclude, if such services are to be delivered in Hertfordshire, the Minister will have to take a long, hard look at what is going on with our mental health trust. Its budget has been cut by £5 million a year—last year, this year and next year. That will have resource implications, which I hope that she will take into consideration. I tried to make that point with extreme good grace.

Tim Loughton: The preceding speeches proved to be rather like a series of wind-up speeches. I am sure that the Minister will carry on in the same way on probably the most contentious part of the Bill, which was debated long and hard in another place and in Committee.
	The reference by the hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier) to another mental health Bill coming along was rather alarming. We have not had a mental health Bill for 24 years, but if we are not careful a couple are going to come along together—rather like double-decker buses. We are, however, almost at the end of the gestation of this Bill.
	The Bill's provisions on community treatment orders are contentious. I shall talk primarily to amendment No. 96, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Angela Browning) skilfully expounded the virtues of new clauses 13 and 14, which we tabled. The amendment goes to the heart of objections about how CTOs have been placed in the Bill. We intend to put the amendment to a vote at the appropriate time.
	We welcome the Government's climbdown on some of the most objectionable aspects of CTOs, especially on proposed new section 17B(3)(e), which contains the criteria whereby those under a CTO could be directed to "abstain from particular conduct." That would have been one of the most coercive pieces of mental health legislation in any jurisdiction. It would also have been wholly counterproductive and unworkable. I am glad that the Minister has seen that and withdrawn that part of the clause.
	I am also pleased, to an extent, that the Minister has sought to rewrite the conditions of CTOs so that they must have a medical treatment benefit. That is welcome, but it does not go far enough, so we have tabled amendment No. 96, which is a reworking of the amendment that received overwhelming support across all parties in another place. We have listened to the debate and to some of the objections that the Minister and her colleagues made, and have adapted the amendment, we think, to make it more acceptable in dealing with the problems that she flagged up.
	We do not want to dismiss CTOs out of hand, because they have a place. I was a member of the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee, which considered CTOs in great detail. It said that they have a place, but that they should be used for a closely defined set of "revolving door patients", as they are called, in closely defined circumstances. We have taken that line all along. However, the definitions that the Government have left in the clause are still far too broad, will capture too many people, leave too many unanswered questions, and are too open-ended. The amendment defines the criteria for CTOs in limited circumstances, which are not to include criminal proceedings, that are deemed to be necessary to protect the public, which we all agree with, and to protect the person, him or herself. That meets the Minister's concern that we were ignoring the plight of those with suicidal tendencies. That was never the intention. In any case, they are covered by other parts of the Bill.
	A concern was also expressed in another place that we could end up issuing a lot more CTOs to people who could be deemed to be suicidal. That would overload the system and many more people would be under CTOs, with limited, and certainly questionable, benefit. We have responded to what the Minister said and have added to the definitions where it is necessary to protect somebody.
	We have also adapted part of the amendment so that a person may have a CTO imposed on them
	"if he has refused to accept medical treatment for a mental disorder"
	in the previous five years—effectively, somebody who has form. The second time that he comes under compulsion in the system, the responsible clinician may decide that a CTO would be appropriate.
	We believe that there are good grounds for the five-year period. The wording is based on the New South Wales Mental Health Act 1990. Australia is one of the countries that operate a form of CTOs. There has recently been an extensive review of the Act, focusing particularly on CTOs, and there was no push to change the wording in the new Bill published last week. What we are suggesting has not been conjured up out of the air; it has precedents in parts of the world with experience of CTOs that are very different from the coercive variety that the Government are trying to introduce.
	Our second criterion is that a medical treatment order should be permissible when refusal of medical treatment has led to a significant relapse justifying a compulsory admission, whether or not an admission subsequently took place. The Minister suggested that someone might not have been admitted despite qualifying for admission, and that in such circumstances there would not be grounds for a CTO. Our view is that if compulsory admission was justified, that should count towards a CTO. The final criterion is for subsequent medical treatment to have alleviated the patient's condition.
	We have thought a great deal about how CTO criteria can be honed to ensure that they affect a closely defined set of people in a closely defined set of circumstances and take account of many of the potential loopholes identified by the Minister, although I believe that most of her suggestions were unjustified. There is no empirical evidence for the efficacy ofCTOs where they exist overseas. They exist in some52 jurisdictions in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Scotland and Israel. In 51 of those jurisdictions the scope is narrower than that of our own law: the definitions are narrower—as is the case in New South Wales—the criteria are narrower, or both. In North America, for example, the scope is substantially narrower. Typically in the United States, imminent serious harm to self or others is required before the powers can be used.
	The long-awaited Churchill report, which the Government commissioned from the Institute of Psychiatry and were then reluctant to publish until the House of Lords had finished its deliberations, followed examination of no fewer than 72 reviews of the workings of CTOs in those six countries. It is the most comprehensive research ever conducted on CTOs. The first key point is that
	"It is not possible to state whether community treatments orders...are beneficial or harmful to patients."
	The Government have been proceeding with a new measure, pioneering new ground affecting new classes of patients, without being able to provide evidence that this arrangement works anywhere in the world where there is an equivalent system. On that basis, it is surely incumbent on them to make the merits of their case categorically and without doubt. We believe that they have failed to do that, which is why we have been keen to ensure that if CTOs are to be used, the circumstances are defined very narrowly. We need to know exactly who will be affected by them, and exactly how people get into and out of them. I shall say more about that when dealing with another amendment in this group. We support the principle of CTOs, but want them to work justifiably in practice. We want a restricted regime.
	According to one body of thought—this is not scaremongering, as some have suggested—CTOs could be counterproductive. That is clear from some of the criteria in briefings received by all Members of the Committee. They state that there is a potential for harm to patients and to service provision for voluntary patients, which should not be discounted, and that
	"CTOs interfere with a person's Article 8(1) rights to private and family life and need to be proportionate under Article 8(2). CTOs increase the numbers of people under compulsion. This brings bureaucratic burdens and adds to the public expenditure."
	Given the comments we have heard about the resourcing of mental health services, there is a genuine fear that CTOs could eat up a substantial and disproportionate part of the mental health budget, to the detriment of other people who require the system on other levels.
	The briefing goes on to state that
	"In the 'blame' culture in which mental health professionals work there is a strong incentive to use extra coercive powers even where they might not be needed or desirable",
	on the basis that if somebody who could have been subjected to a CTO subsequently goes out and commits an atrocity, the flak will hit the professional concerned and he will be asked, "Why wasn't that person put under a CTO? It is available."
	The briefing further states:
	"There is no enthusiasm for the Government's proposals from any other professional group and they are feared by service users."
	The hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier) said that the Royal College of Nursing was in favour of CTOs. It is not. The RCN has questioned some of the criteria, but it is not a great advocate and proponent of CTOs. It and members of the Mental Health Alliance base their position primarily on the responsible clinician criteria,not on CTOs. Regardless of whether there are 75 or80 members of the MHA, the vast majority of professionals, mental health charities, service users and others still have serious reservations about community treatment orders.

Lynne Jones: It is unfortunate that the hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier) raised the current powers, because she has been hoist by her own petard on this issue. I have a letter from Professor Sarawan Singh, one of the psychiatrists who came to the meeting. I have talked to him, and he quotes a survey published in the  British Journal of Psychiatry in 2000, which showed that 46 per cent.of psychiatrists responding were in favour of CTOs,35 per cent. were not in favour and 19 per cent. were unsure. I do not know whether there have been any subsequent surveys, but it would appear that claiming that the majority of psychiatrists are against CTOs is not necessarily true.

Rosie Winterton: We have had a thorough debate. I hope that I will be able to address all the concerns that hon. Members have raised and to explain why we reject several of the amendments that have been tabled. I also hope that I will be able to indicate that we have examined the matter carefully, which is why we have tabled specific amendments on the conditions of supervised community treatment. That has occurred because concerns have been raised about supervised community treatment during extensive debates in the House of Lords and in Committee.
	Let me set out some of the background to supervised community treatment because it represents one of the most important changes that we wish to bring about through the Bill. We want to reflect what takes place in other countries and the fact that more services arenow delivered in the community. We want services to support patients effectively so that they can live safely and successfully in the community in the least restrictive environment that be achieved under compulsory treatment. Such an approach means that patients will spend less time in a hospital environment and more time with their families and loved ones. If we can achieve that without bringing any harm to patients and while protecting others from harm, we should certainly do so.
	When we began this debate many years ago, we intended to allow patients who had not been detained in hospital at all to be on supervised community treatment, which is what happens in Scotland. Legislation was recently introduced in Scotland to provide that people can be detained if a clinician thinks that that is right and to allow people to undergo compulsory treatment in the community, irrespective of whether they have already been detained in a hospital setting. We accepted that there was a great deal of concern about that and listened to the views of the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee. We thus brought forward measures to provide that patients would have to undergo a period of detention in a hospital setting before they could be subject to a supervised community treatment order. Several clinicians criticised us for moving too far and said that we should not restrict clinicians' ability to allow patients to benefit from supervised community treatment if they felt that that was the right thing for the patient. However, we recognised that there was concern about the proposals.
	The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) said that our CTO proposals went wider than those in any of the 52 jurisdictions that he cited. I think that that figure was produced by the Mental Health Alliance, but we have no idea of how its conclusion was reached. It is only in Canada that it is necessary for a patient to be detained in hospital before going on to a CTO. Even in those circumstances, the detention need not take place immediately beforehand, as it must under our proposals. I am thus at a loss as to where that information comes from.

Rosie Winterton: In a number of jurisdictions where conditions are set, they can extend to specifying certain activities. We are talking about requiring someone to abstain from a particular conduct. If using illegal drugs exacerbates a person's condition, or if consuming large amounts of alcohol contributes to their mental health deterioration, such matters are set out in conditions. However, I shall deal later with requirements to abstain from particular forms of behaviour, because they are an important part of the changes made in our amendments.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to existing powers available under the 1983 Act not being effective. The real problem is that those powers, which I believe come under the heading "supervised aftercare", do not allow immediate recall to hospital if the patient's mental health deteriorates to the extent that they become a danger to themselves or to others. I believe that the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr. Walker) referred to the problem facing clinicians in having to go backto the beginning—to a completely new detention scenario—to be able to bring someone back to hospital. That is why those powers have not been used as often as they might have been.

Rosie Winterton: I hope to be able to deal with that question, because it relates to the points that the hon. Gentleman made about the availability of services.
	On whether there are clinicians who support the introduction of CTOs, the new mental health coalition, comprising Unison, Unite, the Royal College of Nursing, the College of Occupational Therapists, the British Psychological Society and the British Association of Occupational Therapists, which together represent85 per cent. of mental health workers, acknowledges in its briefing that
	"there are concerns surrounding the use of Community Treatment Orders, however we also believe that for a number of patients they can provide a real opportunity to be cared for at home. We welcome the Government's amendment that CTOs should demonstrate a health benefit".
	Those organisations represent 85 per cent. of health workers, as well as clinicians.
	The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham may rest assured that I shall certainly apologise to Professor Swartz and the other clinicians who visited the House of Commons for his rather aggressive behaviour toward them. They had given up their time to come and talk to Members of this House and give their views on the Bill, and I felt that the hon. Gentleman dealt with them disgracefully.

Rosie Winterton: My hon. Friend raises an important point about people being deterred from seeking treatment, but one reason why they are deterred is that they feel that they will have to spend a long time in a hospital setting. In actual fact, supervised community treatment is about providing the least restrictive setting that we can, if it is appropriate for a patient. It is about sending a clear message that when we talk about compulsory treatment, it does not always mean having to keep people in a hospital setting; we will allow them to return to their families, if that is appropriate. That is a different message, and it is less stigmatising and less discriminatory than saying that anything to do with compulsion has to involve a hospital setting. I think that the measures will not have the effect that my hon. Friend is talking about.
	I believe, too, that there is a series of reasons whya disproportionate number of people from BME communities receive compulsory treatment. There are delays in people coming forward, because they do not access community services. Some of them take a different route into compulsion—for example, through greater contact with the criminal justice system. Very often, their relatives contact the police, but not health professionals. There is therefore a series of complicated reasons for that disproportionate number, which is why we have introduced the "Delivering race equality" programme, and why—I am afraid to use the phrase, but it is what they are called—we have focused implementation sites around the country, including several in London, which are looking particularly at the reasons why people do not come forward for treatment, and why a greater proportion of BME patients receive compulsory treatment. It is not as easy as saying that there are greater numbers because people are frightened to come forward—the position is much more complex.
	May I tell my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), too, that it is important to remember the fundamental principles? As a result of discussions in the other place, we have included in the Bill the points that should be addressed when we draw up the principles in the code of practice. One of those principles is the avoidance of unlawful discrimination, and we have made it clear in the Bill and the code of the practice that racial discrimination must be tackled as part of the way in which clinicians and the measure itself operate.

Angela Browning: The right hon. Lady has prayed in aid certain groups of professionals who are in favourof CTOs. It is true that last week she managed tofind 11 psychiatrists who support the Bill, but the overwhelming majority of members of the Royal College of Psychiatrists oppose the measure. However, there has been no mention of the patients. Only today, Members received a letter in preparation for our debate on Second Reading from Mind, which represents patients and carers, which said:
	"Mind remains opposed to CTOs. The case for their introduction has not been made."
	It lists six key points to demonstrate why it opposes CTOs, and the Minister will be familiar with them. What about the patients?

Rosie Winterton: I have made it clear over and over again—I hope that the hon. Gentleman acknowledges that, because this is exactly the debate that we had in Committee—that the power is available to clinicians if they think that it is the right thing to do. There is no compulsion on them to use compulsion—it is for them to make the decision, based on a range of issues, and if they think that that is appropriate. May I return to the reason why we believe that supervised community treatment can help to get treatment to people? There are 1,300 suicides every year, and 50 homicides by people who have been in contact with mental health services. We believe that supervised community treatment is vital to helping patients continue to take treatment when they leave hospital and to enable clinicians to take rapid action if relapse is on the horizon.
	All hon. Members know of cases where relatives and carers have had to stand by while somebody's condition deteriorates—one of their loved ones who has a mental health problem, who has perhaps been dischargedfrom hospital, and who may not stay in touch with mental health professionals and continue taking their medication. That person's condition deteriorates and they end up back in a hospital setting or worse, perhaps committing suicide or doing harm to others. That is what we are trying to avoid through supervised community treatment. The Opposition must decide whether they will back us on that or not.

Tim Loughton: If CTOs are so vital to prevent suicides or to prevent homicides, can the Minister citea study anywhere in the world where CTOs have led to a reduction in suicides, a reduction in homicides or a reduction in hospital readmissions when people fail to take medication? I would be fascinated if she can, as no evidence exists.

Rosie Winterton: As we have always said, it is difficult to prove a negative. We do not know what the outcome would have been if the circumstances had been different. The recent report on avoidable deaths looked at homicides and suicides by mental health patients. As I noted, there are about 1,300 suicides a year by people who have been in touch with mental health services. The confidential inquiry into suicides examines all those suicides individually.
	We know, therefore, that in the first two weeks after discharge from hospital, if a patient is not taking medication, the medication is still in their body and is still effective. In the second two weeks, if somebody has stopped taking medication, the effect is felt. We know that 56 suicides took place during that time after discharge from hospital because the person had stopped taking their medication. Nobody is saying that all those suicides could have been prevented, but we know very well that that is a point at which not taking medication will have an effect, and there has been a direct effect on people who commit suicide duringthat time.
	Why do we not owe it to those people and their families and carers to take steps to enable us to supervise people in the community to make sure that they take medication and stay in touch with health care professionals, if the clinician believes that that is the right thing to do? In the case of John Barrett, who had a long history of non-compliance with medication in the community, which as hon. Members know resulted in the dreadful killing of Denis Finnegan, the inquiry team commented that in its view,
	"the only means of securing John Barrett's compliance with treatment as an out-patient would have been a community treatment order".
	That was not available at the time.

Lynne Jones: I can certainly see that there is a rolefor CTOs. I did not get the impression that the psychiatrists at that meeting were lapdogs to the Minister, and I am quite astute at identifying people who toe the line. They said what their experience was. Contrary to the impression that may have been given by the last couple of interventions I have made, I have some sympathy with amendment No. 96. Will my right hon. Friend address the point that CTOs are meantfor a small number of patients who lapse from their treatment and do not take their medication—the "revolving door" type of patient? What is the Government's objection to the amendment, which is about there having been one occasion on which a patient has refused to accept treatment and has subsequently deteriorated? We will have the discussion about impaired decision making tomorrow, so I will not go into that now.

Rosie Winterton: Essentially, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary, given that we have moved so far in terms of supervised community treatment by saying that it must be preceded by one period of detention in hospital. That is completely different from what happens in many other jurisdictions, including Scotland. There have been suggestions about restricting that, which is what the amendment would do. Asthe House will know, in Committee we reversed the amendments introduced in another place on the criteria for SCT, which would have meant that it was not available to patients at risk of suicide, and would have limited it to patients who had had two previous compulsory admissions to hospital. I am glad that the Opposition have conceded that SCT can be helpful in preventing suicide, and that their amendment reflects that. However, I still strongly believe that the suggested restrictions would go too far and are unworkable in practice.
	The Opposition are in effect trying to limit the availability of SCT. Amendment No. 96 would restrict health professionals' ability to make the decision,and make the scheme impossible to operate. It would demand an assessment of a previous relapse, including, crucially, whether compulsory admission to hospital would have been necessary, regardless of whether that admission had taken place. How is it possible fora clinician to look back over a five-year period and decide whether an admission would have been preferable irrespective of whether it took place? Are we asking them to say that the previous professional was wrong in not having admitted the person for compulsory treatment? How do they make an assessment about something that occurred as long beforehand as five years ago, without knowing anything about the precise circumstances?
	That is complete nonsense. Moreover, what relevance would it have to the person's current circumstances? Under SCT, the clinician considers the patient's current circumstances and asks whether they would benefit from it. It is completely ridiculous to ask them to look back five years. That goes back to the issue of having compulsory admission twice. If we, as the House of Commons, were to try to restrict clinicians' ability to do what they think is right for a patient in any other circumstances, we would be wrong and the profession would be up in arms about it. The Opposition are trying to restrict the clinician's ability to make the decision. In effect, we would be saying to people, "Until you become ill again you cannot have supervised community treatment. Please go away, get ill again, and then come back and we can talk about it." It is almost impossible to imagine saying that to patients, or to relatives of somebody in these very limited circumstances.

Rosie Winterton: That is not true. I have already said that 85 per cent. of people who work in mental health services support our amendments.
	The hon. Gentleman should read amendmentNo. 96. It states that
	"the patient has on at least one occasion within five years previous to the present admission...refused to accept medical treatment for mental disorder...there has been a significant relapse in his medical or physical condition justifying compulsory admission to hospital; (whether or not there has been such an admission)."
	It would be impossible for clinicians to operate under those conditions. Again, it would put obstacles in the way of people getting appropriate treatment when they needed it. It would stop people getting that treatment. Although the hon. Gentleman has perhaps tried to solve some of the problems that I pointed out to him in Committee, he has not succeeded.
	Let us consider the proposal to try to place atime limit of three years on supervised community treatment. As hon. Members know, we have tackledthe concerns that patients will find it hard to get off supervised community treatment by making a new requirement that an approved mental health professional must agree to every extension of a CTO. That is a far more sensible method of tackling the matter than imposing another arbitrary time limit. Under the hon. Gentleman's proposal, whether or not a supervised CTO remains the right action in the clinician's opinion, we would say no. That is wrong. It gets in the way of a clinician's ability to make the right decision.
	Supervised community treatment contains many safeguards, including the ability to appeal to the mental health review tribunal and the power of the nearest relative to discharge someone from a CTO. Those are the safeguards and it is not for us to limit clinicians' discretion as the hon. Gentleman suggests.

Rosie Winterton: The amendment does not provide for that. All the safeguards that I have outlined cover the matter. We should not try to limit clinicians' ability.
	Amendment No. 100, which would remove clause 30, is disturbing. Clause 30 requires the responsible clinician to consider supervised community treatment whenever longer-term leave is in view for a patient. If leave of absence for longer than seven days is givento a patient, the clinician should consider whether supervised community treatment is the most appropriate way forward. Anxieties have been expressed about the use of leave of absence when people remain under compulsion but are in the community. We want to ensure that clinicians consider whether supervised community treatment is appropriate so that such supervision exists in the community. Opposition Members would obviously prefer patients to go on leave in the community for long periods without the structure and safeguards of supervised community treatment to support them. That is not the best means of managing patients' care and treatment. It is therefore unacceptable to try to limit the discretion that we are giving clinicians to determine what they do. That is the point: the powers give clinicians discretion; that does not mean that they have to act.
	Further amendments tabled by Opposition Members and by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Dr. Taylor) are designed to impose requirements about consultation. I certainly understand the concern, which was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones). It is important for consultation to take place, but I would draw the attention of hon. Members to the statement of matters that should be considered when we are talking about principles in the code of practice—and that includes the involvement of patients in planning, developing and delivering careand the treatment appropriate to them. We believethat that principle should be at the heart of how the Bill is delivered.
	I am afraid, however, that there are issues of confidentiality. It is true that there will be occasions in which it is not necessarily right to consult a range of people as the amendments suggest. It has to be the patient's right to say who they would or would not like to be consulted, and it would be extremely difficult for us to dictate that from here. These are matters for the code of practice, and I am quite prepared to look further into it and see whether it needs to be strengthened by pointing out that we want consultation. I will look again at that, and I will consult both my hon. Friends and other hon. Members in doing so.
	Other amendments were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris). For example, amendment No. 79 would provide a power for the tribunal to
	"remove or vary any condition"
	relating to the patient's behaviour. Let me explain that we see CTOs operating through clinicians talking with patients about the conditions that would be contained within a supervised community treatment order. If the patient turns around from the word go and says that there is no way that he is going to accept any of it, supervised community treatment will not work.
	It is all about a partnership between patient and clinician—but with the knowledge that if things go wrong, clinicians have the ability to bring someone back into hospital. They do not have to do so. If the patient says that he is not taking his medication because he believes it to be too strong and regardsthe side-effects as unacceptable, the clinician can say, "Well, let's try something else." It does not automatically mean that an individual has to come back into the hospital setting. It is, as I say, about a partnership.
	I recognise the concerns in all these issues about the conditions of supervised community treatment. That is why we are bringing forward some substantial amendments, which place the focus firmly on the purpose of conditions and remove altogether from the Bill the examples of conditions that could be set fora patient. These put beyond doubt the fact thatthe conditions must be about either ensuring that the patient receives treatment, or preventing harm to the patient or others. That means that we have responded to the concerns brought forward in Committee and in the other place and made it absolutely clear what the conditions are about. Given that we have tabled these amendments to the conditions— [Interruption.]

Rosie Winterton: I really need to go through these provisions and address some of the points that the hon. Lady has herself raised.
	We believe that these amendments will clarifyissues that we have discussed with clinicians and with members of the new mental health coalition who pressed for them, so I hope that hon. Members will not press their other amendments but will acknowledge that we must not limit the ability of clinicians or restrict any further supervised community treatment. It is all about getting treatment to people when they need it, and protecting patients and the public from harm.
	As for the amendments that deal with childrenand supervised community treatment, we debatedthem fully in Committee, and although we are fully sympathetic to the spirit behind them, we really do not believe that they are necessary, given the package of safeguards that already exists for both adults and children on SCT.
	Amendments Nos. 97, 98 and 99 would appear to prevent the treatment in emergencies in the community of children who lack competence. In practice, that would mean that in life-threatening situations, a clinician would not be able to treat a patient until they were brought back to hospital. A delay in treatment could spell disaster, so we must reject the proposals. They would mean that clinicians could not treat patients in difficult situations.
	Amendments Nos. 75 to 78, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, attempt to prescribe on the face of the legislation what is meant by "competence". We believe that we have enough guidance to meet some of the concerns raised by my hon. Friend.
	The problem with amendment No. 92 and new clauses 13 and 14 is that they would affect the use of SCT in practice. In attempting to deal with a concern about the review of medication by a second opinion appointed doctor, the proposals would, in practice, prevent a patient from being treated without delay on recall to hospital, and would thus render recall useless. That is unacceptable.

Rosie Winterton: I cannot give way, because the debate has to finish soon.
	Concern has been expressed that a SOAD may not be capable of approving the treatment that may be given on recall, but I must reiterate that the SOAD's review of medication in the community is not a mandate for the treating clinician to give that medication on recall come what may. The clinician will need to make an independent judgment about what treatment is necessary.
	Amendment No. 101 would achieve a further restriction, preventing the use of ECT where it is necessary to prevent a serious deterioration in the patient's condition. We debated that point in Committee and I hope that the hon. Member for Southport(Dr. Pugh) recalls the arguments that were made, especially the example I gave of an anorexic patient, whose problems might not be immediately life-threatening, but could become so if the patient continued to refuse treatment. We cannot stand by and watch such things happen.
	The Government's amendments on supervised community treatment address many of the concerns raised by my hon. Friends and the Opposition, andin the other place. Our proposals will make a real difference by clarifying the conditions; there must be a health benefit, or protection for the patient or the public. The amendments proposed by the Opposition would restrict the ability to use supervised community treatment, and would thus lead to harm to patients and, possibly, to the wider public.

Question accordingly negatived.
	 Amendments made: No. 22, in page 20, line 11, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—
	'(2) But, subject to subsection (3) below, the order may specify conditions only if the responsible clinician, with the agreement of the approved mental health professional mentioned in section 17A(4)(b) above, thinks them necessary or appropriate for one or more of the following purposes—
	(a) ensuring that the patient receives medical treatment;
	(b) preventing risk of harm to the patient's health or safety;
	(c) protecting other persons.
	(3) The order shall specify—
	(a) a condition that the patient make himself available for examination under section 20A below; and
	(b) a condition that, if it is proposed to give a certificate under Part 4A of this Act in his case, he make himself available for examination so as to enable the certificate to be given.'.
	No. 23, in page 20, line 30, after 'order', insert 'by virtue of subsection (2) above'.
	No. 24, in page 21, line 25, leave out 'imposedunder section 17B(3)(d)' and insert 'specified under section 17B(3)'.— [Mr. Watts.]

Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuantto Standing Order No. 118(6), (Delegated Legislation Committees),

Mr. Speaker: With the leave of the House, I will put motions 4, 5 and 6 together.
	 Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuantto Standing Order No. 118(6) (Delegated Legislation Committees),

Iain Wright: I am very grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for allowing me to secure this debate on an issue that is affecting many of my constituents, and which is hindering Hartlepool's ability to achieve its potential.
	Over the past six to 12 months, housing-related matters have become the No. 1 issue in my constituency workload, eclipsing even antisocial behaviour as the main concern. I carry out weekly advice and street surgeries throughout the town, and a large proportion of work arising from them stems from an imbalance in housing supply and demand, resulting in people being unable to secure suitable and appropriate housing.
	There are a number of different strands to the housing case load that I receive. The majority of cases involve families who are unable to find an affordable or suitable property. A family with just two children, let alone any more kids, finds it increasingly difficult to secure social housing. An increasing number of elderly or disabled constituents also contact me to request my help in securing adaptations to their homes such as stair lifts and walk-in showers. The disabled facilities grant has helped in this regard, but the demand for such services and for that grant far outstrips the available resources. Some elderly or disabled people wish to move from their homes altogether. They are getting older and becoming more infirm, their children may have grown up and left the family home, and their current house may no longer be suitable; they would much prefer to live in a properly adapted bungalow. That would also have the advantage of freeing up family homes, but the number of appropriate bungalows in Hartlepool is extremely low.
	I also detect a growing number of homeless people who are priced out of the social and private rented markets altogether. In an extreme example, a constituent who came to see me—she was pregnant, quite heavily so—and her boyfriend were living on an allotment, waiting to be allocated suitable social housing. Such instances are mercifully rare, but they demonstrate vividly the imbalance between the demand for property and the available supply.
	On the face of it, Hartlepool does not have the same issues of affordability as other parts of the country. Stockton-on-Tees has the highest average house prices in the Tees valley, while my constituency vies with Middlesbrough in the sub-region for the cheapest house prices. Moreover, average earnings of full-time employees in Hartlepool are among the highest in the Tees valley. That means that, on a crude price/earnings ratio, Hartlepool is one of the most affordable parts of the country in terms of buying a house.
	It is true that in recent years, thanks to a relatively buoyant local and regional employment market and historically low interest rates, housing development in my constituency has been extremely healthy. We have seen the rise of new housing developments, such as Bishop Cuthbert and Middle Warren, with a high proportion of three, four and even five-bedroom homes being built. We have an exciting development at Hartlepool Quays, where modern homes are being targeted at young and prosperous professionals, keen to enjoy the marina's leisure facilities and the high quality bars and restaurants.
	A Hartlepool couple who are both in work are more likely today to be able to afford and choose to live in a four-bedroom detached house or a modern apartment on the marina, than an equivalent couple some 20 or30 years ago, when higher interest rates and other factors may have meant that they started their journey of property ownership in a two-bedroom terraced house. But the blunt ratio of affordability masks a great deal in terms of the experience of people in my constituency. The borough is the 14th most deprivedin the country and more than half of the town's population lives in areas that are classified by the index of multiple deprivation as being in the 10 per cent. most disadvantaged in the country.
	There are fewer people in professional or managerial jobs and more with lower skills than the national average. The number of those unemployed or classed as economically inactive remains relatively high, although the number in work is now at a record level and the unemployment rate has come down dramatically over the past decade. There are also fewer people classed as owner-occupiers and more in rented accommodation than the average for England and Wales. That means that for a far too large proportion of my constituents, being able to secure a foot on the property ladder is simply unachievable.
	Hartlepool is often referred to as the largest village in the world, with everybody knowing everybody else. In some respects that may be true, although I do not necessarily see it that way: I view Hartlepool more as a close collection of very distinct neighbourhoods and communities, with areas such as Headland, Dyke House and West View, Owton Manor and Rossmere, each with their own identities and each with their own specific housing issues.
	For the centre of Hartlepool, for example, there is a need to regenerate and halt the symptoms associated with inner-city decline. In that part of my constituency, there is an over-abundance of small Victorian terraced properties. Some 41 per cent. of the town's entire housing stock is classed as two-bedroom terraced property, compared with 26 per cent. nationally, and that tenure is located almost exclusively in the centre of town, with boundaries that align closely with the new deal for communities regeneration project.
	In the late 1940s, Max Lock, who undertook a major planning review of Hartlepool, classified much of that area as blighted housing, with a recommendation that the terraced housing should be cleared. It has taken 60 years, and another Labour Government, before any real progress has been made.
	Today, four of the weakest nine neighbourhoods across the whole of the Tees valley in terms of the so-called vitality index are in central Hartlepool, namely Dyke House, Grange, Belle Vue and Stranton. There has been acute and long-term market failurein that area, with properties being snapped up by developers a couple of years ago for as little as £10,000 or £12,000. As I mentioned earlier, for those in work, historically low and stable interest rates have meant that people have often been able to aspire to and buy larger houses as their starter home, as opposed to the traditional two-up, two-down. That has produced a doughnut effect, which sees a trend of people moving out of the centre of Hartlepool and into the suburbs. The ownership ratio has also flipped over in those areas in the last decade, with private landlords taking over the majority of that type of property. That has accelerated and exacerbated the problems in thearea, because landlords, often with no knowledge of the patch—or even with no knowledge of where Hartlepool or the north-east is at all—have frequently moved tenants with antisocial and criminal tendencies into the properties. That has undermined the sense of community and made long-standing residents resort to moving out, often selling to private landlords and accelerating the decline, or remaining and living in fear and subject to intimidation.
	The housing problems are different in other parts of the town. Areas such as the Raby gardens and Easington road parts of Dyke House, and, to a lesser extent, Belle Vue in Stranton, are suffering from uncertainty and delay due to the lack of a firm commitment on their future. As part of the north-central Hartlepool master plan, Tees Valley Living, Housing Hartlepool and Hartlepool borough council are examining closely whether properties in those areas should be modernised or demolished. However, the process is being delayed, largely due to uncertainty about future flows of money to undertake regeneration work. That is causing residents to put their lives and hopes on hold. One resident in the area told me that she would like to put a new kitchen in her home, but was reluctant to do so because of the uncertainty in her area. The residents are willing to invest, but although that resident owns her own house, she does not know whether it will stay up or be pulled down.
	Other areas of the town have different problems. In the 1940s and 1950s, large council housing estates were built, such as West View, Owton Manor and Rossmere, where both sides of my family were brought up. The right to buy has meant that there has been a gradual, yet marked, reduction in the supply of social housing over the past 20 years. Alongside that trend, council housing stock has been transferred to Housing Hartlepool, a newly-established registered social landlord. Under the socially committed leadership of Cath Purdy, its chief executive, it has ensured in three short years that two thirds of its 7,000 properties have met the decent homes standard. It is well on track to exceed the Government's target. It has improved the thermal efficiency of homes and put an emphasis on renewable sources of energy and insulation. It is extremely proactive in the community. I chair the local strategic partnership, so I am aware of Housing Hartlepool's contribution to the town's respect, neighbourhood renewal, social enterprise and financial inclusion agendas, which is all to the betterment of Hartlepool.
	Therein lies the problem, however. While, to put it bluntly, demand for council homes was not high five years ago, which reflected a long-term failure to invest in housing stock, the success of Housing Hartlepool's modernisation programme means that people want to live in such homes, which symbolises the regeneration and reinvigoration of our neighbourhoods to which the organisation is contributing.
	Those neighbourhoods have deep roots. I knowfrom my surgery of many examples of three or four generations of the same family living in Owton Manor or West View, for example. That was what I meant when I said that Hartlepool was a collection of communities or villages. Younger people rightly want to stay close to their parents or grandparents. Such a situation might ease child care problems and thus help people to get jobs or embark on training and education and thus improve their standard of living. We should therefore encourage that trend as much as possible. However, the demand for Housing Hartlepool's properties greatly exceeds the available supply. The void rate for its 7,000 properties is just above 1 per cent., while 0.8 per cent. of properties are ready to let imminently. That trend is mirrored by the situation for other RSLs throughout the town.
	The right to buy policy of the past 20 years has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the building of social housing, either generally across the town, or in areas identified as those with acute need. In Rossmere, for example, where both my parents grew up, the extent of the use of the right to buy has been astronomical. The former council estate has an owner-occupier rate of over 90 per cent., and the demand for social housing in the area is completely unmet. Much more needs to be done to match supply with demand in parts of the town such as Rossmere, West View and Owton Manor.
	In addition to the past and current issues, Hartlepool has further requirements if the needs and aspirations of my constituents are to be met in the years to come. Itis forecast that in the next 15 years, the number of households in the borough will rise by 13 per cent., which is on a par with the highest increases in the entire Tees valley. Moreover, the number of people older than 75 will increase by a massive 25 per cent., which will mean that a quarter of the borough's residents will be in their late 70s by 2021. That will have enormous repercussions for public services and the availabilityof appropriate housing. We are struggling to meet housing need at the moment. Future social and demographic trends show that we will be deluged in the next decade or so by an even larger excess of demand over supply of housing.
	One of the frustrating things is that all the relevant partners already identify the need for action. In many cases, real progress has already been made, which shows that Hartlepool can progress and deliver when permitted. In the centre of town, where housing market renewal is necessary, the process of demolishing older properties is taking place as we speak, and new bungalows and other properties are being built. In other parts of the country, such clearance has aroused strong anger among communities, but not in Hartlepool. I can do no better than to quote an extract from an Audit Commission report published earlier this year:
	"Ambitions and plans which have been developed with local people are communicated clearly to them. This approach has been particularly beneficial in the Housing Market Renewal area of the town, where the quality of communication and involvement, the clarity of vision and objectives, and the close partnership working of all stakeholders, including developers, has engendered local enthusiasm for radical changes to the area and very few objections to the Compulsory Purchase Orders".
	In small ways, Housing Hartlepool and other RSLs are building properties that are designed to tackle the problems of the supply of social housing. Housing Hartlepool, is building new properties in Nicolson way, for example, and to address the issue of an older population, the local authority, the health service and the Joseph Rowntree Housing Trust are building an innovative retirement village comprising 200 flats and bungalows—a scheme that won £9.8 million fromthe Government's extra care housing fund. Those initiatives show that Hartlepool can and does deliver on housing market renewal and development. I am therefore confident that achievements would be madeif the Government provided additional resourcesand, perhaps just as importantly, allowed additional flexibilities to enable more to be done.
	The comprehensive spending review hints at a flatline settlement for housing market renewal. For Tees Valley Living, that means about £45 million over the period 2008 to 2011 shared between four local authorities. Although Hartlepool is classed as a priority area for Tees Valley Living and HMR, largely because of its acute need and record on delivery, that means that my constituency will receive only about £3.75 million per year. Sites have now been identified and local communities consulted and enthused about what needs to be done, but progress will simply not happen at that level of funding. That further blights the area and hinders development. I therefore support Tees Valley Living's submission to the Government calling for £30 million per annum over the next five years, which would provide certainty across the sub-region and allow truly sustainable, prosperous and aspirational communities to be developed.
	Perhaps of equal importance to additional resources is the need for greater flexibility for councils and RSLs to build homes. We need to redress the imbalance between demand and supply. We need more appropriate social housing in areas where properties are in demand. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will outline how means such as donation of council land to RSLs at nil cost, prudential borrowing for the local authority to build homes, and joint venture arrangements between the council, RSLs and other partners to build more housing stock could be used to resolve the problems and to increase the supply of social and affordable housing in Hartlepool. The local authority, RSLs and other partners are coming together to consider an agreed way forward in terms of land use planning, land disposal and funding, but we are at an extremely early stage in this process and I would welcome anything that the Minister can do both to facilitate and to accelerate that co-ordination and to meet the need for flexibility.
	I am increasingly coming to the view that housing, particularly social housing, should be on a par in terms of a Labour Government's priorities with education and the national health service. Good-quality housing in sustainable communities raises people's hopes. A failure to meet housing needs runs the risk of consigning a generation of my constituents to low aspirations and a poor quality of life. Indeed, we need something similar to building schools for the future to secure additional social housing to help my constituents to achieve a better standard of living and realise their potential.
	I am heartened by the fact that in the past few weeks, during the Labour Party's leadership and deputy leadership campaigns, the need for additional social housing has been identified and debated. I hope that tonight I have been able to demonstrate that social housing is not an issue that is confined to London and the south-east, but one that can be—indeed, is—very relevant to areas that are considered to be more affordable, such as the north-east and my constituency. I am keen to hear from my hon. Friend what additional help the Government can provide to ensure that the housing challenges in Hartlepool, both now and in the future, are met.

Meg Munn: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Wright) on securing the debate and on raising an issue of such importance to his constituents.
	A decent home for everyone is a key Government priority. Our policy is set out in the 2005 "Homes for All" statement:
	"Our vision of sustainable communities is to provide places that offer everyone a decent home that they can afford, in a community in which they want to live and work, now and in the future."
	As my hon. Friend said, the housing markethas undergone dramatic changes in recent times, particularly in Hartlepool, where the rate of increase in house prices was, for a period, the highest in England, albeit that prices started from a low base. I appreciate that increasing property values and rents, and shortages of affordable homes, have made things difficult for everyone, especially those setting out to buy a house for the first time. The Government are working with their partners in the public and private sectors to increase the number, range and quality of homes available.
	We are making significant progress towards meeting the decent homes targets in the public and private sectors. We have invested more than £20 billion of public money in improving council housing since 1997, and more than £40 billion will have been invested by 2010. Since 1997, an additional £7.4 billion has been provided through borrowing by housing associations. We have increased the number of decent social homes by more than 1 million, and increased the proportion of vulnerable households in the private sector that have a decent home to 66 per cent.
	As my hon. Friend mentioned, Housing Hartlepool took over ownership of Hartlepool's 7,500 council houses in 2004, and since then it has been working to achieve the decent homes standard. He is correct to say that it is more than two thirds of the way to achieving 100 per cent. by 2010, and the Audit Commission considers it to be "performing well". In addition to improvements to the existing stock, we want the creation of more affordable housing and new homes to be built at an increased rate. We are streamlining the planning system to ensure that a regular and reliable supply of land for new housing is available. The recently released planning policy statement on housing, commonly known as PPS3, enables local authorities to deal with the planning system more strategically to create places where communities can thrive.
	The North East Housing Board recently published research on the use of section 106 agreements in the north-east and how those agreements can be better utilised. Private sector house builders have been active in the area and the annual build rates in Hartlepool between 1995 and 2003 were steady, at around 370 new dwellings a year. Hartlepool borough council is increasingly focusing on the issue of affordable housing. A housing needs survey will soon be published; it will reflect the most up-to-date guidance on issues of affordability. After that, the council will meet the Housing Corporation and registered social landlords to discuss appropriate action. The council is preparing a framework to increase housing supply, and it is currently updating its planning policies and land sales policies. It continues to negotiate with developers to ensure the inclusion of social housing in areas such as Victoria harbour, to which my hon. Friend referred.
	The council has also been considering the supply side of the issue, although it does not own a great deal of land. It needs to take into account the fact that planning permissions for several thousand homes were granted in the 1980s, and those permissions predatethe most recent dramatic price increases. As the permissions were granted some time ago, they did not include section 106 agreements for affordable homes.
	As my hon. Friend said, Hartlepool is the 14th most deprived of the 354 English boroughs, and more than half of the borough's residents live in areas that are among the 10 per cent. most disadvantaged in the country. Until recently, issues of affordability were not significant in the area, but price rises, particularly of better quality homes, has led to difficulty for first-time buyers. Despite those problems, Hartlepool borough council is well placed to develop the strategic approach to housing that is necessary for the borough and the rest of the Tees valley area.
	The council is firmly established in the top third of all local authorities in England, and in its corporate assessment report of March this year, the Audit Commission said:
	"There is good integration of housing and environmental improvements as key components of the regeneration of neighbourhoods."
	I commend the excellent work that is being done in that regard. My hon. Friend referred to the housing market renewal programme; in 2006, Tees Valley Living areas were allocated £18.25 million between 2006 and 2008. That is excellent news for the sub-region. It will enable Tees Valley Living and partner local authorities to press ahead with their plans to bring about much-needed transformational change by replacing obsolete housing, improving existing properties, and helping to create mixed and sustained communities where people want to live and work. Authorities in the Tees valley area have combined to form Tees Valley Living, and are in the process of finalising a costed, prioritised sub-regional housing strategy for submission to the North East Housing Board in July. That is a key document for the determination of the next round of the single housing investment pot. Over the period 2006 to 2008, Tees Valley Living has been allocated more than £13 million from single housing investment pot funding for projects across the sub-region, of which 21 per cent. was spent in Hartlepool. Authorities in the Tees valley area have shown a strong lead in developing a strategic approach to housing, which is commendable and in line with the Government's vision for the future of housing policy.
	What is the future, and, as my hon. Friend asked, what needs to happen now? The changing circumstances that he outlined bring new demands, so there is a need for new ways of working. Housing providers and local authorities need to increase house building rates; address the vexed issues of stock renewal; improve and maintain the quality of existing stock by achieving and going beyond the decent homes target; and meet specific community and social needs, particularly among vulnerable groups. It is essential to ensure that a suitable range of types and sizes of property is provided, based on a clear understanding of local needs and aspirations—hence the Government's emphasis on the importance of robust and up-to-date housing market assessments in the preparation of housing strategies. New building has a major role to play, but, at best, new homes represent a minor proportion of the total stock. We need, too, to maintain and improve existing homes and, where appropriate, redevelop outdated property.
	My hon. Friend asked about future funding. Like any other Minister, I do not know the outcome of the comprehensive spending review. He has made his case well, and he articulated his constituents' needs, and that is now on the record. I thank him for giving me the opportunity to set out the work that is under way. We are living at a time when a great deal is changing, and the Government recognise the need to respond to increased and changing housing need.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Adjourned accordingly at eight minutes to Eleven o'clock.